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—Fyodor Dostoevsky2 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota (UND) School of Law; 
Director, UND Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies.  The author would like to 
thank his research assistants, Justin Kepplinger and Amber Hildebrandt, for their 
invaluable assistance throughout the project.  He is also grateful for the support of his 
family and friends. 
1 CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS 63 (D.C. Lau trans., 1979) (500 B.C.). 
2 FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 849 (Constance Garnett trans., 
Random House 1995) (1880). 
OREGON
LAW 
REVIEW
       2009 
VOLUME 88 
NUMBER 3 
 
 622 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
If you want peace, work for justice. 
—Pope Paul VI3 
ver the past twenty years, thousands of children have been 
awakened at gunpoint in the middle of the night, beaten, 
terrorized, and forced to kill their own parents.4  So began their 
abduction into the “Lord’s Resistance Army” (LRA), a northern 
Ugandan rebel group fighting the government of Yoweri Museveni.5  
Once abducted, the children were subjected to, and forced to 
participate in, beatings, rapes, and mutilations of each other and of 
other civilians in northern Ugandan villages.6  In 2005, based on a 
referral by the Ugandan government, five LRA leaders, including the 
group’s chief, Joseph Kony, were indicted by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).7  According to an ICC-issued arrest warrant, 
Kony’s sealed indictment contains twelve counts of crimes against 
humanity, including murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement, and 
rape.8  There are also twenty-one counts of war crimes, including 
murder, cruel treatment of civilians, intentional attacks against a 
civilian population, pillaging, rape, and forced enlistment of 
children.9  Kony has remained a fugitive but has engaged in peace 
talks with the Ugandan government, nearly resulting in his signing of 
a peace accord, which, among other things, contemplates the 
establishment of a truth commission and the institution of mato 
oput—a ritual practice during which a criminal faces relatives of his 
victim and admits “his crime before both drink a bitter brew made 
from a tree root mixed with sheep’s blood.”10 
Although the peace accord did not involve international criminal 
prosecution of the LRA, Kony refused to sign it unless the ICC 
 
3 BrainyQuote.com, Pope Paul VI Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/ 
p/popepaulvi159653.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
4 See DeNeen L. Brown, A Child’s Hell in the Lord’s Resistance Army, WASH. POST, 
May 10, 2006, at C1. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. 
7 Chris McGreal, “More Than Anything We Want Our Children Back.  They Have 
Suffered So Much,” GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 9, 2007, at 14, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/09/uganda.chrismcgreal. 
8 Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony 
Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, ¶ 42 (Sept. 27, 2005). 
9 Id. 
10 Francis Kwera, Ugandan Rebels Welcome Prospect of Avoiding Jail, REUTERS, Mar. 
12, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL12379331. 
O 
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indictments were dismissed.11  In 2008, President Museveni indicated 
that the ICC should dismiss its case against the LRA leaders so they 
could avoid prison and face traditional justice.12  Last year, he stated 
at a press conference that two of the LRA leaders who had indicated a 
willingness to surrender, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo, 
could be eligible for amnesty.13  He also suggested that even Kony 
himself might have been eligible for amnesty had the peace talks been 
successful and that he “still has a chance to take advantage of the 
amnesty if he stops fighting.”14 
Should Kony and his henchmen be handled through 
traditional/alternative methods of justice at home rather than 
prosecuted as criminals in The Hague?  In large part, the answer 
pivots on an understanding of the principle of “complementarity,” 
which awards primacy of jurisdiction to a state’s domestic courts 
unless the ICC determines the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely 
to carry out the . . . prosecution.”15  In his excellent article, Mass 
Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice, Lars Waldorf wonders how traditional, domestic restorative 
justice should relate to international criminal justice.16  For Waldorf, 
this “raises a key concern about the [ICC’s] complementarity regime: 
should meaningful, local justice be counted as part of a state’s good 
faith efforts to provide post-conflict accountability, such as would 
preclude the ICC from asserting jurisdiction?”17 
Certain commentators have answered Waldorf’s question in the 
affirmative.  They believe that alternative, domestic justice 
mechanisms, such as mato oput or truth commissions, can relieve the 
ICC of its obligation to prosecute under the complementarity 
principle.18  However, this literature provides only general 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Odhiambo Won’t Face World Court, NEW VISION (Uganda), Feb. 10, 2009, 
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/671013. 
14 Id.; see also Ugandan Rebel Leader Still Eligible for Amnesty: Museveni, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE (Fr.), Mar. 9, 2009. 
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(1)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
16 Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as 
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006). 
17 Id. at 5. 
18 See, e.g., Claudia Cárdenas Aravena, The Admissibility Test Before the International 
Criminal Court Under Special Consideration of Amnesties and Truth Commissions, in 
COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
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suggestions for how the ICC could determine whether alternative 
mechanisms render a case inadmissible under the complementarity 
regime.  Linda Keller, for example, advises the Court to focus on 
more theoretical considerations, such as whether the domestic 
procedure “further[s] retribution, deterrence, expressivism, and 
restorative justice to a similar extent as international prosecution.”19  
More recently, Alexander Greenawalt grappled with the issue from a 
general institutional perspective, opining that the ICC’s duty to handle 
such cases is a function of its role as either: a “constrained and 
ministerial body;” a “modern administrative agency” with “broad 
policymaking discretion;” an “inwardly focused court” concerned 
more with the maintenance of its docket and prestige than transitional 
justice; or an “incomplete and unstable institution,” dependent on 
external actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
the United Nations Security Council, “to imbue it with the efficacy 
and legitimacy that it does not inherently possess.”20 
 
INTERNATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AMSTERDAM, 25/26 JUNE 2004, at 115 (Jann K. 
Kleffner & Gerben Kor eds., 2006) [hereinafter COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON 
COMPLEMENTARITY] (providing a mechanistic application of complementarity 
admissibility tests that closely tracks the facial language of the Rome Statute and 
determining that, in narrow circumstances, use of alternative mechanisms could result in 
ICC deferral of prosecution); Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The 
International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 209, 275–78 (2008) (arguing that use of truth commission and mato oput in 
Uganda would justify deferring ICC prosecution of LRA leaders); Carsten Stahn, 
Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative 
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 695, 710 (2005) 
(concluding that “Article 17 could provide room for inadmissibility of cases, where the 
crimes are investigated by a domestic . . . truth commission”); Thomas Hethe Clark, Note, 
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Amnesties, and the “Interests of 
Justice”: Striking a Delicate Balance, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 389, 414 
(2005) (finding that while the ICC appears to require prosecution, ambiguous provisions 
leave room for alternative justice schemes in limited circumstances). 
19 Keller, supra note 18, at 279.  Keller’s criteria do implicate some practical 
considerations, such as the extent of punishment short of incarceration, victim 
participation, redress, and general societal reconciliation.  Id. at 266–78. 
20 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, 
and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 160–61 (2009); see also Eric 
Fish, Comment, Peace Through Complementarity: The Uganda Case and the Over-
Deterrence Problem in International Criminal Court Indictments, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript at 7–8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498524) (opining that, in 
the context of proposed amnesties for the LRA in Uganda, the issue should be decided by 
the answers to three questions: “[(1)] How strong a deterrent is the threat of ICC 
prosecutions to people considering becoming war criminals?[; (2)] How much of that 
deterrent value is lost by allowing war criminals to negotiate for amnesty?[; and (3)] How 
badly does the fear of a future prison sentence in The Hague disrupt peace negotiations?”). 
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Unfortunately, this analysis, while providing a good starting point, 
overlooks a relevant set of more detailed criteria both external to and 
lying below the surface of the justice mechanism itself.21  Former 
ICC External Relations Adviser Darryl Robinson notes that certain 
difficult, alternative justice admissibility questions require case-by-
case analysis based on a set of defined criteria.22  Although Robinson 
does not specify the questions he has in mind, a number of them seem 
apparent.  For example, is the target of ICC prosecution a member of 
the government in the domestic jurisdiction?  Is the target a member 
of a rebel group (such as Kony)?  If so, what is his position in the 
group?  Is it contemplated that the target will ultimately be 
reintegrated into society?  If so, what would be his role in society?  Is 
the domestic request for deferral, based on resort to an alternative 
justice mechanism, made before or after the ICC has been seized of 
the case?  If after, how much time has elapsed since the referral?  
Does the alternative justice mechanism contain elements of formal 
judicial procedure?  How extensive and detailed is the investigative 
procedure?  Does the alternative mechanism contemplate some form 
of nonincarcerative sanctioning, such as restitution, community 
service, reintegrative shaming, or reparations? 
 
21 In his article, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some 
Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, Carsten Stahn begins to 
examine some of these criteria, but his analysis is confined almost exclusively to the effect 
of amnesties and pardons.  Stahn, supra note 18.  Moreover, within these tight parameters, 
he focuses on a limited set of criteria and gives the set minimal treatment.  For example, 
by looking at Article 17 of the Rome Statute, he arrives at the following general 
conclusions: (1) the ICC has judicial freedom to determine if an amnesty, a pardon, or any 
other alternative forms of justice are allowed under the statute; (2) criminal responsibility 
exemptions for crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction granted through pardons or amnesties 
are generally incompatible with the statute; and (3) amnesties or pardons should only be 
permitted in exceptional situations, namely where they are accompanied by alternative 
kinds of justice and are conditional.  Id. at 700–16.  Stahn does scratch the surface of 
certain relevant criteria by inquiring generally about: (1) the level of due process afforded 
by the alternative mechanism, (2) the nature of the state granting an amnesty (looking only 
at whether it is the state’s territory on which the crime occurred), (3) the nature of the 
crime (noting broadly that the ICC is tasked with prosecuting only the most grave crimes), 
and (4) the position of the defendant (only briefly considering whether the defendant is 
high level or not).  Id. at 706–07, 713; see also Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of 
Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 481, 498–502 (2003) (providing limited, although helpful, criteria, such as the 
“quasi-judicial” nature of the mechanism, but doing so only in the context of amnesties 
and truth commissions). 
22 See Darryl Robinson, Comments on Chapter 4 of Claudia Cárdenas Aravena, in 
COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 18, at 141, 146. 
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Based on these questions and others, this Article proposes a set of 
evaluative criteria the ICC can use to formulate an admissibility test 
for conducting a complementarity analysis in difficult cases of 
domestic resort to alternative justice mechanisms.  Part II of this 
Article provides an overview of the statutory framework of the ICC 
complementarity regime and explains how that regime functions.  Part 
III examines some of the forms of alternative justice that might 
confront the ICC when applying an admissibility test, including 
traditional practices such as mato oput (and judicial hybrids of such 
practices), truth commissions, lustration (a mechanism for political 
vetting), reparations, and amnesties.  Part IV then sets out the analytic 
criteria organized into five general categories: (1) the circumstances 
surrounding the ICC referral and request for deferral, (2) the political 
system and infrastructure in the domestic jurisdiction, (3) the 
alternative justice mechanism itself, (4) the crimes at issue, and (5) 
the prosecution targets.  Part V applies the test to the case of the LRA 
leaders and the alternative justice mechanisms proposed in the LRA-
Uganda peace accord. 
The Article demonstrates that, in light of the scale and brutality of 
the LRA atrocities, the nature of the defendants, and the 
characteristics of the proposed mechanisms, the contemplated resort 
to alternative justice in Uganda will not pass complementarity muster.  
On the other hand, the Article shows that, in certain situations, some 
forms of alternative justice—especially multiple ones conjoined or 
tethered to other domestic judicial efforts—could conceivably pass 
the proposed complementarity admissibility test. 
Along the way, this analysis also helps illuminate our increasingly 
complex understanding of the relationship between international 
criminal law and domestic justice in atrocity situations.  The 
essentially retributive nature of the former is evolving to make way 
for restorative goals, and at the same time, certain retributive 
characteristics are being incorporated into the latter as alternative 
justice mechanisms adapt to deal with the new and horrible 
phenomenon of mass atrocity.  In the end, the Article shows that 
effective atrocity justice entails a proper division of labor between 
local restoration and global retribution.  While complementarity could 
be the ideal medium to achieve that allocation, the proposed analytic 
criteria must be used to weave both peace and justice more seamlessly 
into the procedural fabric of international criminal law. 
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II 
THE ICC COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME 
A.  Introduction 
Complementarity, one of the cornerstone principles of the 
International Criminal Court,23 defines the relationship between states 
and the ICC.24  It signifies that cases are admissible before the ICC if 
a state either remains wholly inactive or lacks the capacity or will 
genuinely to investigate and prosecute atrocity cases within the ICC’s 
subject matter jurisdiction.25  Thus, it embeds an institutional 
preference for national action that endows domestic courts with the 
primary task of handling cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.26 
In contrast to the “primacy” over national courts of the two ad hoc 
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)27 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR),28 as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),29 
complementarity empowers states to foreclose ICC adjudication 
through a good faith application of domestic criminal process.30 
B.  Rationales for Complementarity 
There are three underlying rationales for this approach.  The first is 
practical.  Given the ICC’s relatively limited resources, infrastructure, 
and personnel, its framers were loath to confer exclusively on it the 
potentially broad range and number of future relevant atrocity cases 
 
23 See COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 18, at v.  The 
preamble of the Rome Statute emphasizes that “the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”  
Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.  Article 1 of the document contains identical language. 
24 Rome Statute, supra note 15, pmbl. 
25 See id. art. 17(1)(a). 
26 See id. pmbl. & art. 17(1)(a). 
27 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1192 (2003), 
adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
28 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994), 
adopted by S.C. Res. 955, art. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
29 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 8, entered in force Aug. 14, 2000, 
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html. 
30 See COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 18, at v. 
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likely to arise on the Court.31  It made more sense to leave the vast 
majority of those cases to municipal courts.32  Besides a resource 
advantage, the latter would have a strong jurisdictional connection 
with the case based on territoriality or nationality.33  Additionally, 
among other reasons, these domestic courts would likely have more 
means available to collar the accused and to collect the necessary 
evidence.34 
Second, the ICC architects were motivated to respect state 
sovereignty to the greatest extent possible.35  Complementarity pays 
obeisance to such a state-centric worldview and thus best preserves 
the dominant Westphalian order.36 
Third, complementarity enlarges the field of battle against the 
culture of impunity by incentivizing a large number of domestic 
jurisdictions to become more operational and effective at 
investigating and prosecuting cases of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.37  The expanded number of jurisdictions 
has the potential to bolster both the deterrence and expressive goals of 
international criminal justice. 
C.  The Policy Tension in Complementarity 
Two guiding principles on opposite ends of the policy spectrum 
seem to inform the approach to complementarity: partnership and 
 
31 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351 (2003). 
32 Id. 
33 The “territorial principle” permits the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant when 
the crime at issue is committed on the territory of the forum state.  See Matthew D. 
Campbell, Note, Bombs over Baghdad: Addressing Criminal Liability of a U.S. President 
for Acts of War, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 235, 253–54 (2006).  The 
“nationality principle” gives rise to jurisdiction when the alleged defendant is a national of 
the forum state.  See id.  Even if these grounds were not available, jurisdiction could be 
asserted on grounds of universality.  Pursuant to the “universality principle,” states may 
criminalize atrocity crimes, such as genocide, regardless of the crime’s location or 
perpetrator.  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio 
Erga Omnes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63, 67–69 (1996). 
34 See CASSESE, supra note 31, at 351. 
35 Id. 
36 See Frédéric Mégret, In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of 
International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 725, 730–32 (2005); Leila Nadya 
Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 385 (2000) (suggesting that the complementarity principle 
comports with Westphalian notions of state sovereignty). 
37 See CASSESE, supra note 31, at 353. 
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vigilance.38  “Partnership” represents the more positive side of 
complementarity that occurs when states are genuinely open to 
investigating and prosecuting alleged perpetrators.39  In that situation, 
the Prosecutor can encourage the domestic jurisdiction to initiate 
proceedings, develop cooperative anti-impunity strategies, “and 
possibly provide advice and certain forms of assistance to facilitate 
national efforts.”40  In certain cases, this might result in an explicit 
consensual division of labor—e.g., if “a conflict-torn State is unable 
to carry out effective proceedings against persons most 
responsible.”41  
At the other end of the spectrum, pursuant to the “vigilance” 
principle, “the ICC must diligently carry out its responsibilities under 
the [Rome] Statute.”42  This includes gathering “information in order 
to verify that national procedures are carried out genuinely.”43  Where 
there are indicia that a domestic process is not genuine, the Prosecutor 
should be prepared to take follow-up steps, resulting, if necessary, in 
an exercise of jurisdiction.44  According to a 2003 report on 
complementarity, 
these twin aspects of the complementarity function (partnership and 
vigilance) are in tension and yet are inseparably related. For 
example, the advice and guidance of the partnership function may 
resolve potential short-comings in the national proceedings and thus 
avoid any need to consider ICC exercise of jurisdiction under the 
vigilance function. Conversely, the mere existence of 
complementarity fact-finding activities will often encourage 
genuine and effective national proceedings.45 
D.  Mechanics of Complementarity 
Complementarity is operationalized in the form of an admissibility 
examination set forth in Articles 17 to 20 of the Rome Statute of the 
 
38 See INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT 
PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE, NO. ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶ 3 
(2003) [hereinafter INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER], available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc656350.pdf. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
 630 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).46  Article 17 sets out the 
substantive principles of complementarity,47 while Articles 18 and 19 
provide its procedural components.48  Article 20, titled “Ne bis in 
idem,” provides a kind of retrospective complementarity protection by 
preventing persons from being tried or punished twice for the same 
crime49—effectively precluding ICC admissibility if a domestic 
jurisdiction has conducted a legitimate trial of the suspect at issue.50  
The Article 20 “ne bis in idem” protection is incorporated into Article 
17(1)(c).51 
1.  Procedural Operation 
From a procedural perspective, Article 18 covers preliminary 
admissibility rulings and Article 19 covers subsequent admissibility 
determinations.52  Pursuant to Article 18, the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) must notify any state with apparent jurisdiction of a 
pending investigation and give it an opportunity to supplant the 
ICC.53  The state then has one month both to inform the ICC that it is 
investigating, or has investigated, certain persons related to the OTP’s 
investigation and to request that the OTP suspend its inquiry.54  
 
46 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 17–20; see also COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON 
COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 18, at v.  Article 53, dealing with prosecutorial discretion, 
might at first blush be considered another threshold admissibility hurdle.  See Rome 
Statute, supra note 15, art. 53.  It permits the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to decline to 
initiate an investigation in the interests of justice—even if there is a reasonable basis on 
the law and facts and the case is admissible.  Id. art. 53(1).  It similarly allows for the 
decision not to prosecute in the interests of justice after the OTP investigates the otherwise 
admissible case.  Id. art. 53(2).  Thus, Article 53 does not deal directly with 
admissibility—it looks at the “interests of justice” beyond the question of admissibility.  
See id. art. 53. 
47 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17; see also Keller, supra note 18, at 252–53. 
48 Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 18–19. 
49 Id. art. 20; see also Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal 
Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 
687 (2007) (explaining that the Latin phrase non bis in idem roughly translates to “not 
twice for the same thing”).  While this civil law protection is related to the common law 
double jeopardy protection, it is different because ne bis in idem “addresses the possibility 
of repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in different legal systems, whereas double 
jeopardy generally refers to repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in the same legal 
system.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 See Keller, supra note 18, at 244–45. 
51 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17(1)(c). 
52 Id. arts. 18–19. 
53 Id. art. 18(1). 
54 Id. art. 18(2). 
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Absent special authorization by the ICC, the OTP must defer to the 
state’s investigation under Article 18.55  The OTP may then ask for 
updates regarding the state’s investigation and prosecution.56 
Article 19 permits the ICC to consider admissibility on a sua 
sponte basis.57  Additionally, any arrest warrant target or state with 
jurisdiction may challenge Article 17 admissibility via Article 19.58  
The state is required to do so at the earliest opportunity.59  The OTP 
may also ask the Court to determine admissibility.60  “Prior to the 
confirmation of the charges, challenges to the admissibility of a case 
or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court shall be referred to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.  After confirmation of the charges, they [are 
directed] to the Trial Chamber.”61  While the challenge is pending, 
the investigation and presumably any prosecution would be 
suspended,62 although the validity of any arrest warrant would not be 
affected.63  If the Court determines that the case is inadmissible, the 
OTP does not have to drop the case completely64 and may ask the 
Court to review the decision if new facts arise that negate the basis for 
inadmissibility.65 
2.  Substantive Considerations 
Of course, these procedural mechanics all hinge on substantive 
determinations made pursuant to the provisions of Article 17.  The 
first paragraph of Article 17 declares that a case is admissible before 
the ICC unless: 
(a)  The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it . . . ; 
(b)  The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute 
the person concerned . . . ; 
 
55 See id. art. 18; see also Keller, supra note 18, at 252. 
56 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 18(3), (5). 
57 Id. art. 19(1). 
58 Id. art. 19(2). 
59 Id. art. 19(5). 
60 Id. art. 19(3). 
61 Id. art. 19(6). 
62 Id. art. 19(7). 
63 Id. art. 19(9). 
64 See id. art. 19(8). 
65 Id. art. 19(10). 
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(c)  The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which 
is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not 
permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by 
the Court.66 
On a superficial level, these inadmissibility criteria are relatively 
straightforward.  Claudia Cárdenas Aravena describes an 
“investigation” as “a systematic inquiry about the facts of a crime and 
about participation in it.”67  A prosecution, she opines, consists of a 
state’s “opening and undertaking of a judicial criminal process.”68  As 
previously discussed, subsection (c) of Article 17, which deals with 
“ne bis in idem,” requires a previous domestic trial.  Subsection (d) 
mandates inadmissibility if a case is not of sufficient gravity.  Clearly, 
“this ground for inadmissibility will be rather exceptional, taking into 
account the inherent gravity” of the Rome Statute’s core crimes.69 
The rub in Article 17 comes not from these stated grounds of 
inadmissibility, but rather from their exceptions, as set out in the 
concluding language of Article 17(1)(a) and (b).70  That language 
deems a case admissible before the ICC when the state is “unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”71 
The analysis then focuses on what is meant by “unwillingness” or 
“inability” of a state to prosecute or try a person accused or suspected 
of international crimes.  These two notions are addressed in Article 
17(2) and (3).  A state may be considered “unwilling” when: (1) the 
national authorities have undertaken proceedings “for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility”; (2) 
there has been an “unjustified delay” in the proceedings showing that, 
in fact, the authorities do not intend to bring the person concerned to 
justice; or (3) the proceedings are not being conducted independently, 
impartially, or in a manner showing the intent to bring the person to 
justice.72 
A state is considered “unable” when, chiefly owing to a total or 
partial collapse of its judicial system, it is not in a position to: (1) 
detain the accused or to have the person surrendered by the authorities 
 
66 Id. art. 17(1). 
67 Aravena, supra note 18, at 117. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 120. 
70 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17(1)(a)–(b). 
71 Id. (emphasis added). 
72 Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c). 
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or bodies that hold him in custody, (2) collect the necessary evidence, 
or (3) carry out criminal proceedings.73  Another “inability” situation 
occurs when “the national court is unable to try a person not because 
of a collapse or malfunctioning of the judicial system, but [rather] on 
account of legislative impediments, such as . . . a statute of 
limitations, making it impossible for the national judge to commence 
proceedings against the . . . accused.”74 
As already indicated, Article 20, via Article 17(1)(c), also factors 
into the substantive admissibility determination.  In particular, Article 
20(3) prevents the ICC from asserting jurisdiction over a person who 
has been tried by “another court” for the same conduct, unless the 
proceedings in the other court: 
(a) [w]ere for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility . . . or 
(b) [o]therwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by 
international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.75 
In extreme cases, such as the total collapse of a country’s 
infrastructure, a country explicitly thumbing its nose at calls for 
justice, or the prosecution of an atrocity suspect pursuant to the most 
rigorous due process standards, the statutory framework yields easy 
answers regarding admissibility.  But is that true of the less black-
and-white cases?  What if a country processes a matter by deviating 
from the traditional Western retributive paradigm—i.e., a police or 
magistrate investigation followed by an adversarial or inquisitorial 
trial contemplating or resulting in incarceration?  Can it be said in 
such circumstances that the country was “unwilling or unable 
genuinely” to carry out the investigation or prosecution?76  Or might 
 
73 Id. art. 17(3). 
74 CASSESE, supra note 31, at 352. 
75 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 20(3). 
76 See JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 270–71 (2008) (“While non-criminal accountability 
processes would accordingly render cases admissible in accordance with Articles 17 (1)(a) 
and (b) in conjunction with Article 17 (2)(a), they would also arguably do so under the two 
other forms of ‘unwillingness’ in Article 17 (2)(b) and (c) under certain circumstances.”).  
But see Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Relevance of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court for Amnesties and Truth Commissions, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 553, 
570 (“[I]f criminal punishment is waived by a truth commission in the interest of re-
establishing peace[,] the purpose is not to shield individual persons but to serve a greater 
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it be said that the proceedings “‘were not conducted independently or 
impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized 
by international law[’]”?77 
Of course, these questions are implicated when alternative justice 
mechanisms, emphasizing restorative rather than retributive 
considerations, are employed in domestic jurisdictions.  To 
understand how these mechanisms diverge from classic penological 
process, it is necessary to consider their nature and breadth. 
III 
A TAXONOMY OF ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
It would be a mistake to conceive of the various alternative justice 
mechanisms as a monolithic set.  Rather, each has unique 
characteristics and processes that promote reconciliation and 
restoration.  That said, for analytical purposes it is useful to place 
them in five broad categories: (1) customary local procedures, (2) 
truth commissions, (3) lustration, (4) reparations, and (5) amnesties.78  
Each shall be considered in turn. 
A.  Customary Local Procedures 
The term “customary local procedures” (CLPs) refers to 
indigenous methods of dispute resolution that are carried out locally, 
and according to traditional customs, with varying degrees of 
connection (sometimes none) to any adjacent, official government 
adjudication infrastructure.79  In contrast to Western criminal 
resolution models, which tend to focus on individualized justice and 
punishment of specific perpetrators, CLPs seek to foster holistic 
community healing and reconciliation.80  In general terms, these 
 
objective at the expense of criminal justice. . . . This suggests that a state in such cases is 
not unwilling genuinely to carry out the prosecution as required by article 17.”). 
77 MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (2007) 
(quoting Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 20(3)(b)). 
78 See David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2621, 2622 (2006) (identifying amnesties, truth commissions, 
lustration, and reparations as mechanisms used in transitional contexts); Keller, supra note 
18, at 275–76 (focusing generally on customary local procedures, such as mato oput, truth 
commissions, and reparations). 
79 See generally Brynna Connolly, Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals 
for a Recognition Typology, 38 CONN. L. REV. 239 (2005) (surveying various 
characteristics of these systems to determine how each relates to one another and to formal 
state adjudicatory processes). 
80 See Waldorf, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
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mechanisms are less formal than official government adjudicatory 
mechanisms and they involve a higher degree of public 
participation.81  In the end, they often combine “truth-telling, 
amnesty, justice, reparations, and apology.”82 
This section will examine a series of representative customary local 
procedures: (1) Shalish (Bangladesh), (2) Gacaca (Rwanda), (3) Nahe 
Biti Boot (East Timor), (4) Kgotla (Botswana), (5) Katarungang 
Pambarangay (the Philippines), and (6) Mato Oput (Uganda).83 
1.  Shalish—Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, the “indigenous form of dispute resolution”84 is 
known as “shalish”—akin to “informal village tribunals.”85  There are 
currently three versions of shalish: (1) traditional, (2) government-
administered, and (3) non-governmental-organization (NGO)-
modified.86 
Traditional shalish involves consent-based arbitration or mediation 
procedures, which may extend through numerous sessions over 
several months, during which disputants pursue negotiations both 
within and outside the shalish setting.87  The process has been 
described as “[‘]a loud and passionate event which is generally open 
to the whole community but is largely male-dominated.’”88 
 
81 Id. 
82 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 1, 11 
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). 
83 These CLPs do not by any means represent a comprehensive list.  They are included 
to provide a representative sample that reflects different customs, procedures, and 
remedies, as well as geographic diversity.  That said, there may certainly be other CLPs 
with different features and from different locales that could have been included.  In the 
interests of space and in line with its scope, this Article is limited to six of these 
procedures. 
84 Neal Milner, Illusions and Delusions About Conflict Management—In Africa and 
Elsewhere, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 621, 624 (2002).  According to the United Nations 
Development Program, about sixty to seventy percent of disputes in Bangladesh are 
resolved through shalish.  Connolly, supra note 79, at 262–63. 
85 Sajeda Amin & Sara Hossain, Religious & Cultural Rights: Women’s Reproductive 
Rights and the Politics of Fundamentalism: A View from Bangladesh, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 
1319, 1326 (1995). 
86 Stephen Golub, Non-State Justice Systems in Bangladesh and the Philippines (Jan. 
2003), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DS34.pdf (unpublished paper prepared for the 
United Kingdom Department for International Development). 
87 Id. 
88 Connolly, supra note 79, at 263 (quoting DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., DFID POLICY 
STATEMENT ON SAFETY, SECURITY AND ACCESSIBLE JUSTICE 7 (2000)). 
 636 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
Under this traditional system, village elders select five to nine 
people to act as the arbiters or mediators.89  “Local villagers consider 
the decision to be binding even though it lacks legal authority and 
occurs outside of the formal judicial system.”90  The subject matter of 
traditional shalish is largely civil in nature (including property and 
family disputes), although in certain localities it involves 
nonconsensual criminal adjudication, imposition of punishment, and, 
in some cases, even fatwahs.91 
Operating simultaneously with, but independently of, traditional 
shalish, government-administered shalish is run by the Union 
Parishad (UP)—the lowest unit of electoral government in 
Bangladesh.92  It is charged by the state with arbitrating and settling 
family and civil disputes and minor criminal offenses.93  In these 
shalish village courts, the plaintiff and the accused “are represented 
by two members of the parishad and two members from the 
village.”94 
NGO-facilitated shalish, for its part, is different from the other two 
forms in that it places greater emphasis on mediation, more 
involvement by women, and a higher degree of integration with other 
community development projects.95  It also includes NGO 
involvement in the selection and training of panels and the 
documentation of proceedings.96  Given these differences, there is a 
consensus, particularly among women, that NGO-facilitated shalish is 
the most effective and legitimate form of local Bangladeshi dispute 
resolution.97 
 
89 Janice H. Lam, Note, The Rise of the NGO in Bangladesh: Lessons on Improving 
Access to Justice for Women and Religious Minorities, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 
124 n.191 (2006). 
90 Id. 
91 Golub, supra note 86. 
92 Habib Zafarullah & Mohammad Habibur Rahman, Human Rights, Civil Society and 
Nongovernmental Organizations: The Nexus in Bangladesh, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 1011, 1030 
& n.44 (2002). 
93 Golub, supra note 86.  As Professor Golub explains, the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance of 1961 enables the UP to arbitrate family disputes, and both the Village Court 
Ordinance of 1976 and Conciliation of Dispute Ordinance of 1979 empower the UP to 
decide minor criminal offenses and civil disputes.  Id. 
94 Zafarullah & Rahman, supra note 92, at 1030 n.45. 
95 Golub, supra note 86.  NGO-facilitated shalish has grown in recent years, prompted 
principally by the efforts of the Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA) and affiliated 
NGOs.  Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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2.  Gacaca—Rwanda 
The indigenous traditional dispute resolution method in Rwanda is 
known as “gacaca,” which translates as “justice on the grass” in the 
Kinyarwanda language.98  As with most communal restorative 
mechanisms, it was designed primarily to resolve sundry civil matters 
such as property, inheritance, and family law disputes.99  It 
occasionally dealt with minor criminal offenses, but its sanction 
resembled a civil settlement, such as compensation, rather than a 
criminal punishment, such as imprisonment.100  Gacaca was 
traditionally presided over by community elders known in 
Kinyarwanda as inyangamugayo, which literally means “those who 
detest disgrace.”101  These older men dominated gacaca—women 
were not even permitted to speak.102 
Traditional gacaca imposed a wide range of sanctions to achieve 
restitution and reconciliation.103  Any such sanctions, though, were 
not individualized—family members were also responsible for 
satisfying gacaca judgments.104  Injecting some festivity into the 
proceedings, the losing party typically had to provide beer, wine, or 
food as a form of reconciliation to the community.105  Overall, the 
principal goal of gacaca was to “‘[restore] social order, after 
sanctioning the violation of shared values, through the re-integration 
of offender(s) into the community.’”106 
In 1994, Rwanda was engulfed in massive violence that claimed 
the lives of close to one million people and has been described as 
“one of the worst genocides in history.”107  Some refer to the violence 
 
98 DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 85. 
99 Id. at 93.  There is some disagreement as to whether gacaca occasionally 
encompassed adjudication of crimes. 
100 Connolly, supra note 79, at 269.  Mark Drumbl writes that traditional gacaca 
“exceptionally” handled “violent and serious crimes.”  DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 93. 
101 Waldorf, supra note 16, at 48. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 49; Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the 
Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 778–79 
(2007). 
106 Connolly, supra note 79, at 268 (quoting AMNESTY INT’L, GACACA: A QUESTION 
OF JUSTICE 20 (2002)). 
107 Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to 
Reconciliation in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 125 (2008).  “More people 
died [in Rwanda] in three months [April to June 1994] than in over four years of conflict 
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as “a populist genocide,” since nearly every stratum of society, 
“including children, participated in killing their neighbors with 
common farm tools” (most often, machetes).108  In the immediate 
aftermath of the genocide, it was estimated that close to 100,000 
people were being held in detention on genocide-related charges.109  
“As of 2003, there were approximately 87,000 detainees still in 
Rwandan prisons.”110 
Given both the unprecedented scope and number of perpetrators 
and the limited capacities of international and domestic courts to 
process them,111 Rwanda developed a modified version of gacaca to 
dispense mass justice in a relatively compressed time frame.112  Two 
legal documents establish the mechanics of gacaca: the Organic Law 
of 1996 (Organic Law) and the Gacaca Law of 2001, which was 
modified three times (to a minimal extent in June 2001 and June 2006 
and more substantially in June 2004).113  The Organic Law is 
 
in Yugoslavia.”  Id.  In fact, the pace of the killing was five times faster than the Nazi 
mass murder of Jews in the Holocaust.  Id. 
108 Id. 
109 See José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 393 (1999) (explaining that 90,000 people were being held in 
Rwandan prisons awaiting trial on charges stemming from the genocide as of September 
1996). 
110 Megan M. Carpenter, Bare Justice: A Feminist Theory of Justice and Its Potential 
Application to Crimes of Sexual Violence in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 41 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 595, 646 (2008). 
111 See Waldorf, supra note 16, at 43–44 (noting that, of the nearly 100,000 detainees in 
custody from December 1996 through December 2003, Rwandan domestic courts had 
tried only about 9700).  As of 2008, the international court set up to prosecute Rwandan 
génocidaires, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, had managed a total of only 
thirty convictions.  See Inés Mónica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, 
Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2008). 
112 See Waldorf, supra note 16, at 48. 
113 See Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide 
or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990, Organic Law No. 08/96 
(1996) (Rwanda) [hereinafter Organic Law].  The three documents that comprise these 
modifications are: Organic Law Modifying and Completing the Organic Law Setting Up 
Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of 
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Between 1 October 1993 and 31 
December 1994, No.22/2001 of June 22, 2001 (Rwanda) [hereinafter Gacaca Law 
(Modified 2001)]; Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca 
Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide 
and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 
31, 1994, Organic Law No. 16/2004 (2004) (Rwanda) [hereinafter Gacaca Law (Modified 
2004)]; Modifying and Complementing Organic Law No. 16/2004 of June 19, 2004 
Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged 
with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes 
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intended to prosecute “the crime of genocide or crimes against 
humanity” or “offences . . . committed in connection with the events 
surrounding the genocide and crimes against humanity.”114 
This modified version of “gacaca,” established, promoted, and 
operated by the Rwandan government, is comprised of approximately 
9000 community-based courts, each overseen by locally elected 
judges and designed to adjudicate the cases of lower-level 
perpetrators of the genocide (with higher-level perpetrators facing 
justice in more formal domestic courts and before the ICTR).115  In 
all cases, investigations are carried out by the lowest-level gacaca 
panel, the cellule.116 
Assuming sufficient evidence is collected, there is an adjudication 
hearing117 where the accused appears but is not represented by 
counsel.118  The evidence against him is heard by seven judges, and 
members of the public can attend the hearing.119  The gacaca law 
provides a very detailed punishment schematic, which includes life 
imprisonment and the death penalty.120  It also includes a panoply of 
nonincarcerative options, such as community service (including such 
chores as tilling the fields and renovating houses destroyed during the 
genocide), dégradation civique (which strips the convict of certain 
 
Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, Organic 
Law No. 28/2006 (2006) (Rwanda) [hereinafter Gacaca Law (Modified 2006)].  Gacaca 
Law (Modified 2004) constitutes a more significant rewriting of parts of the original 
Gacaca Law as compared to Gacaca Law (Modified 2001) or Gacaca Law (Modified 
2006).  The 2001 and 2006 revised documents are concerned more with minor changes to 
the wording of several sections of the Gacaca Law, while the 2004 version comprises 
several important reforms of the gacaca process. 
114 Organic Law, supra note 113, art. 1.  “Article 51 of the 2004 gacaca legislation 
creates three categories of offenders”: (1) Category 1—leaders, planners, torturers, 
notorious murderers, rapists, and sexual torturers; (2) Category 2—murderers, assaulters 
who intended to kill, and those who committed offenses against the person without 
intending to kill; and (3) Category 3—“those who committed property offenses.”  
DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 86–87.  Offenders in Category 1 are excluded from local 
gacaca panels and prosecuted more formally.  Id. at 87. 
115 See DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 87. 
116 Id. 
117 See Lawrence G. Albrecht et al., International Human Rights, 41 INT’L LAW. 643, 
648–49 (2007). 
118 Stahn, supra note 18, at 713. 
119 Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca Proceedings in 
Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41, 45 (2007) (“Members of the crowd sit on 
benches out in the open or in a building that serves on other days as a classroom or 
meeting place.”). 
120 DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 87. 
 640 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
civic rights, such as the right to vote or to run for office), and 
restitution.121  Defendants have the right to appeal their sentences to a 
special gacaca court of appeals but not to the regular Rwandan court 
system.122 
In addition to the fact that it is hierarchical and directed by the 
state,123 this newfangled gacaca differs from the traditional system in 
the following respects: (1) it is established by statute and relies on 
written law, (2) it involves women as official administrators and 
judges, (3) it is more systematically organized and integrated into 
administrative divisions of local government, and (4) it imposes 
prison sentences on those found guilty.124  According to Jacques 
Fierens: 
 Such characteristics are in stark contrast to the present gacaca 
courts and their functioning.  The only resemblance lies in the fact 
that the institutional framework for conflict resolution involves 
local and non-professional judges, and, even then, they are elected 
in the reinvented gacaca system, whereas traditional judges were 
appointed by consensus between the concerned parties.  The present 
gacaca court arises from a complex written law; is not traditional; 
rests on a supposedly legal basis; confers no privileges on family 
members; allegedly respects individual rights; favours confessions; 
and does not include any references to religion.125 
3.  Nahe Biti Boot—East Timor 
In East Timor, the traditional, local dispute resolution method is 
known as “nahe biti boot,” named for the unfolding of a large woven 
mat (“biti boot”) on which disputants and community notables resolve 
differences.126  Nahe biti boot is initiated by village elders (“katua”) 
upon the request of an individual with a grievance against people in a 
different village.127 
 
121 See id. at 75, 88–89. 
122 See Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional 
Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 389.  However, “judgments relating to offenses against 
property are not subject to appeal.”  Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Clark, supra note 105, at 788. 
125 Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 896, 913 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
126 Waldorf, supra note 16, at 25. 
127 Security Man, MASSEY U. MAG. (N.Z.), Nov. 2002, available at 
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~wwpubafs/magazine/2002_Nov/stories/security_man.html. 
 2009] Complementarity and Alternative Justice 641 
The katua organises an open meeting with the katua and villagers of 
the person on the other side of the dispute. 
 Katua from each group, the disputants and their families and 
villagers meet to discuss matters until a resolution is reached 
agreeable to both parties.  The katua and the community oversee the 
process and the administration of penalties.  Katua have the 
authority to get things done and each side monitors the 
implementation to ensure penalties and corrective actions are 
carried out.128 
Traditionally, nahe biti boot served as a local forum to resolve minor 
disputes concerning use of land or resources.129  Instead of resorting 
to nahe biti boot or other, less formal dispute resolution methods 
during the five hundred years they were ruled by the Portuguese and 
Indonesians, the Timorese had always relied on the official courts of 
their overlords to deal with serious crimes.130 
Nevertheless, nahe biti boot was put to use in East Timor by the 
United Nations (UN) in the wake of massive violence that occurred 
there a little over one decade ago.131  After a sizable majority of East 
Timorese opted for independence from Indonesia in an August 1999 
UN-sponsored referendum, Indonesian-backed militias brutally 
attacked civilians and property throughout the island, “killing at least 
528 people, creating over half a million refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and destroying much of the country’s 
infrastructure.”132 
In response, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) used a modified version of nahe biti boot as part of a 
“Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) to hold local truth and 
reconciliation hearings designed, in part, to encourage the repatriation 
and reintegration of approximately one hundred thousand East 
Timorese refugees (including former militia members) then in West 
Timor.”133  At the end of the hearings, perpetrators signed a 
Community Reconciliation Agreement (CRA) detailing the acts of 
reconciliation that had been agreed on: “community service; 
 
128 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harawira Craig Pearless, United 
Nations District Security Advisor in East Timor). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. 
132 Waldorf, supra note 16, at 24 (footnote omitted). 
133 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  This was part of a truth and reconciliation 
process that involved the creation of a “Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation or ‘CAVR.’”  Id. 
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reparation; public apology; and/or other act[s] of contrition.”134  In 
general, CRAs were followed by reconciliation ceremonies attended 
by local administrative and religious figures and involving various 
ritual practices, such as sacrificing small animals, chewing betel-nut, 
and celebratory feasting.135 
Although the CRP contemplated handling only minor crimes, such 
as minor assault, theft, and the killing of livestock,136 the massive 
volume of cases overwhelmed the formal justice mechanisms, and the 
traditional process ended up being used for far more serious cases.137  
According to one UN official: 
 The militia man who had murdered two people had cut out their 
tongues and eaten them in front of their families.  He returned to his 
village after his own katua reluctantly agreed to take him back as 
long as he remained in the village and did not visit public places, 
while the katua of the victim’s village had flatly refused to be 
involved and warned he would not be responsible for the militia 
member’s safety. 
 My impression is that the UN civilian police involved in 
reintegration are eager to deal with cases as quickly as possible.  
There is no protocol for the civilian police or UN Human Rights 
staff for integrating militiamen.  I think the police consider nahe biti 
boot too time-consuming and are not committed to any sort of 
lasting resolution.138 
As a result, people were expected to live next door to those who had 
“committed hideous crimes against them and their fellows as if 
nothing has happened.”139  According to the same UN official, the 
process was 
 
134 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor [UNTAET], On the 
Establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, § 
27.7, UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (July 13, 2001) [hereinafter UNTAET Reg. No. 2001/10].  
A mixed national/international tribunal (the Special Panel for Serious Crimes or SPSC) 
was set up to prosecute “serious crimes,” which included genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, murder, torture, and sexual offenses.  UNTAET, On the 
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, § 1.3, 
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000).  When it closed in May 2005, the SPSC had tried 
only 87 of 440 indicted suspects because most (339) were located outside the court’s 
jurisdiction.  Press Release, Judicial Sys. Monitoring Programme, The Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes Hear Their Final Case (May 12, 2005), http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/ 
Justice Update/2005/May 2005/050520_JSMP_JUissue12(e).pdf. 
135 Waldorf, supra note 16, at 25. 
136 Id. at 24. 
137 Security Man, supra note 127. 
138 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harawira Craig 
Pearless, United Nations District Security Advisor in East Timor). 
139 Id. 
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being cosmetically applied, falling short of the aim of stopping the 
galling burr of perceived injustice forming and growing in this 
generation and poisoning the next. 
 “For people to have any hope of putting their worst experiences 
behind them, they need to see the offenders punished and 
remorseful.  They need to feel they have been dealt with.  There 
needs to be repair of the harm caused, if possible.  In East Timor 
there are not enough resources or serious crimes investigators to 
deal with all the crime.  The prisons and courts are backlogged.  
They appear to be dealing with the minor offenders and not the big 
players.  Timorese militia leaders are just coming back, setting up 
and carrying on. 
 When the UN backs off and the families of the victims see that 
nothing has happened to this guy, they are going to take the law into 
their own hands and dish out their own justice, and that comes at the 
end of a machete from what I’ve seen. 
 The irony is . . . that the people, helped by their predominantly 
Catholic beliefs, have a strong will to forgive and put their trauma 
behind them.  Simple processes of justice, if properly applied now, 
would have much success with a population who genuinely have no 
wish to be burdened forever by their past.”140 
4.  Kgotla—Botswana 
By the seventeenth century, tribes in Botswana had formed the 
kgotla—a formal assembly of male adults that served as both a 
discussion forum for community issues and a tribal court.141  From 
the time Botswana became a British protectorate in 1885 (and 
developed a formal court system) until its independence in 1966, it 
retained the kgotla.142  Thus, it had formed a dual court system: tribal 
courts were competent to apply only customary law in civil cases, and 
the High Court and subordinate courts were competent to apply the 
common law.143 
There are currently four levels of customary courts.  At the bottom 
level, the lower customary courts correspond with the kgotla and are 
often convened by a “headman” in an outlying village.144  The second 
level is known as the higher customary court, or “chiefs’ courts,” 
 
140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harawira Craig Pearless, United 
Nations District Security Advisor in East Timor). 
141 NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, DEMOCRACIES IN REGIONS OF 
CRISIS: BOTSWANA, COSTA RICA, ISRAEL 93–95 (1990). 
142 Connolly, supra note 79, at 281–82. 
143 T.W. BENNETT, THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
THE CONFLICT OF PERSONAL LAWS 54–55 (1985). 
144 1 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 184 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002). 
 644 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
which generally act as courts of appeal for the lower customary 
courts.145  Appeal may be taken from the chiefs’ courts to the third 
level—the customary courts of appeal and the customary courts’ 
commissioner.146  Finally, appeals from this court may be raised in 
the High Court.147 
Although the customary court system in Botswana is relatively 
independent, it is still linked to the formal state courts.148  For 
example, the customary courts “must be granted warrants by the local 
government, and appeal ultimately may be taken to the formal state 
courts.”149 
5.  Katarungang Pambarangay—The Philippines 
Traditionally, the lowest unit of social organization for small 
communities in the Philippines was the “barangay.”150  Throughout 
early Filipino history, the barangay was used as a forum for dispute 
resolution with friends and neighbors serving as mediators.151  This 
popular justice mechanism was known as Katarungang 
Pambarangay.152  Although Spanish colonizers later attempted to 
supplant “barangay norms whenever they conflicted with the Spanish 
Civil Code,” a 1978 decree by the Marcos government incorporated 
them into the formal state system (through the “Katarungang 
Pambarangay law”).153 
The Katarungang Pambarangay law provides for a nationwide 
system of dispute processing by means of mediation at the 
neighborhood and village level.154  The law accomplishes this by 
dividing the country into 42,000 barangays.155  Each barangay has a 
ten- to twenty-member Lupong Tagapamayapa (Lupong), which is a 
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148 Connolly, supra note 79, at 282. 
149 Id. at 282–83. 
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152 See Reynaldo L. Suarez, Dean, Univ. of the E. Coll. of Law, Mediation in the 
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153 Connolly, supra note 79, at 265. 
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council of mediators consisting of village residents.156  The Lupong 
members, who must possess impartiality, integrity, a sense of 
fairness, independence of mind, and a reputation for probity, are 
selected by a “Punong Barangay”—the barangay captain or 
“Chairman of the Lupong.”157  The barangay captain is “the principal 
neighborhood/village official whose everyday occupation is normally 
non-governmental.”158 
Disputants begin the Katarungang Pambarangay process by 
submitting a case to the Punong Barangay, who attempts to 
mediate.159  If this initial attempt at mediation fails, the case is 
referred to a panel of three Lupong members (the “Pangkat”) for 
conciliation.160  “The Pangkat members are selected by the parties, or 
if the parties cannot agree, chosen by lot by the [Punong 
Barangay].”161  In resolving disputes, the substantive law relied on is 
comprised of the customs and norms of the particular community.  
Conflicts must be processed “in an informal manner ‘without regard 
to technical rules of evidence, and as is best calculated to effect a fair 
settlement of the dispute and bring about a harmonious relationship of 
the parties.’”162  “Lawyers may not participate as counsel.”163  All 
mediation proceedings are recorded (both at the Punong and Lupong 
levels), and copies of these recordings are provided to the disputants 
and the municipal government.164 
The members of the Lupong “meet monthly to provide a forum for 
exchange of ideas among its members and the public on matters 
relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes, and to enable various 
conciliation panel members to share with one another their 
observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of 
disputes.”165  “The [Lupong] submits data on the barangay disputes 
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and their disposition to a Municipal Monitoring Unit, which provides 
feedback regarding the program to the government.”166 
“In terms of its goals, the Katarungang Pambarangay law sets 
forth as its official objectives the ‘speedy administration of justice’ 
and the diversion of disputes from the regular courts as a means of 
reducing the alleged congestion in the national adjudicative 
institutions.”167  That said, agreements reached pursuant to this 
process are binding and ultimately enforceable by the formal state 
courts.168  The alternative justice system is linked to the formal state 
system in another important way: submitting a dispute to the 
conciliation panel is a prerequisite to filing a case in state court.169 
Katarungang Pambarangay is mostly limited to civil disputes.170  
Where the conflict has criminal implications, Katarungang 
Pambarangay can only handle it “if the penalties do not exceed a year 
in prison or a fine of 5000 [Filipino] pesos” (equivalent to a 
misdemeanor in the American court system).171  Victimless crimes or 
“[c]rimes committed by government personnel in the course of their 
official functions cannot be submitted to the [Katarungang 
Pambarangay].”172 
Katarungang Pambarangay has been plagued by certain justice 
deficits.  First, as Stephen Golub explains, problems of personal bias 
pervade local conciliation proceedings, and the wealthy are often 
perceived as able to obtain “better” justice.173  Moreover, in gender-
related issues, the male perspective of the dispute normally 
prevails.174  In light of this, Brynna Connolly suggests that 
Katarungang Pambarangay may not meet basic human rights 
standards.175 
Of course, problems affecting this alternative justice mechanism 
are not solely a product of underlying societal factors.  They also 
include more technical and financial constraints, including: (1) the 
administrators’ limited understanding of the system and technical 
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capacity for implementing it, (2) the lack of reporting from and 
oversight of these administrators, (3) the inadequate informational 
outreach to the public, and (4) the budgetary constraints that stymie 
government attempts to deal with these other issues.176 
6.  Mato Oput—Uganda 
Mato oput is a traditional justice mechanism developed and used 
by the Acholi people of Northern Uganda.177  “[I]n Acholi, [mato 
oput] means drinking the herb of the Oput tree, a blinding-bitter 
tree.”178 
The reconciliation process is called Mato Oput because it ends in a 
significant ceremony of reconciling the parties in conflict. 
 . . . The process involves the guilty acknowledging 
responsibility, repenting, asking for forgiveness, paying 
compensation and being reconciled with the victim’s family through 
sharing the bitter drink—Mato Oput. The victim’s clan must accept 
the plea for forgiveness for the reconciliation to be complete.179 
The end result may also include restrictions on the movement of the 
perpetrators.180 
The entire process is quite involved: 
 The first step . . . involves a separation of the affected clans 
which serves as a cooling off period to prevent immediate revenge 
killings.  This separation requires the complete suspension of 
relations between the families of the perpetrator and the victim, 
during which time the clans are forbidden to intermarry, trade, 
socialize, or share food and drink. . . . The second step in mato oput 
involves a mediation process, which allows the affected families to 
create an account of the facts which emphasizes the perpetrator’s 
voluntary confession, including the motives, the circumstances of 
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177 Dieu-Donné Wedi Djamba, The Ugandan Peace Process in Perspective, 
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180 See Kathleen Ellen MacMillan, Note, The Practicability of Amnesty as a Non-
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the crime, and an expression of remorse. . . . Finally, in the last step, 
the family of the perpetrator pays compensation raised through the 
contributions of clan members.181 
Next, the parties engage in the actual, day-long mato oput 
reconciliation ceremony, which is presided over by the local chief 
(rwot moo) and involves “an elaborate set of final, symbolic acts.”182  
Despite certain variations, the ceremony proceeds as follows: 
 First, the offending party beats a stick to broadly symbolize mato 
oput’s restorative purpose and then runs away to signify acceptance 
of guilt for the murder.  Second, the parties cut in half a sheep and a 
goat and exchange opposite sides.  The offending clan supplies the 
sheep, which represents the cen, or misfortune, haunting the clan of 
the offender, while the injured clan supplies the goat, which 
symbolizes unity and a willingness to forgive and reconcile.  Third, 
the clans eat boo mukwok, spoiled boo, or local greens, which 
signifies that tension between the clans persisted long enough for 
food to spoil, and also symbolizes the clans’ readiness to reconcile 
after this long period of time.  Fourth, a representative from each 
party drinks oput, bitter root, from a calabash.  The root represents 
the bitterness between the clans, and drinking it symbolizes washing 
away the bitterness between them.  Fifth, both parties cook and eat 
the acwiny, liver, of the sheep and the goat to show that their blood 
has been mixed and united and to symbolically wash away the 
bitterness within the blood of the human liver.  One of the last 
rituals involves consuming odeyo, the remains of a saucepan, which 
is thought to free the parties to eat together again.  The ceremony is 
not complete until the parties have eaten all of the food prepared for 
the day; finishing the food means that no bitterness remains 
between the two clans.183 
As an effective justice mechanism, mato oput is not without its 
problems.  In addition to the fact that few Acholis are aware of this 
old process or even know how it works, experts question its 
efficaciousness as a reconciliation device based on the Acholis’ 
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seemingly limited capacity to forgive.184  Moreover, it is not clear 
that mato oput is designed to deal with large-scale crimes, such as 
mass abduction or killing.185 
Even if it were, mato oput has other limitations.  First, it applies 
only to situations that have come to an end—not to ongoing conflicts 
between individuals or groups.186  Also, mato oput applies only to 
Acholis.187  However, there are numerous ethnic groups in Uganda, 
and mato oput is simply not able to accommodate them.188  By the 
same token, these other groups are unlikely to embrace a practice that 
is alien to them.189 
B.  Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions are generally understood to be “bodies set up to 
investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular 
country—which can include violations by the military or other 
government forces or by armed opposition forces.”190  Some offer 
amnesty to perpetrators and restitution to victims.  In many cases, 
truth commissions offer perhaps the most “judicialized” approach of 
alternative justice mechanisms.  Although they permit victims and 
perpetrators to appear in public (at times, together) to describe their 
experiences during the atrocity period and help achieve individual and 
community catharsis,191 truth commissions also possess many 
features normally associated with the classic penological process: the 
taking of statements, the use of subpoena powers, the use of powers 
of search and seizure, the holding of public hearings, and the 
publication of findings of individual responsibility in a final report.192 
 
184 Id. at 366–67. 
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(2006) (exploring procedural components of truth commissions largely from the 
perspective of those who might be adversely affected by them, including perpetrators, 
witnesses, and victims); Alison Bisset, Book Note, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 401 (2008) 
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To date, more than a couple dozen truth commissions have been 
established around the world.193  In many respects, they vary widely.  
For example, some are established on presidential order; others by 
parliamentary decision.194  Some function outside the view of the 
international community, while others do their work publicly.195  
Certain ones function more like judicial commissions of inquiry196 
when their counterparts employ less formal procedures resembling or 
incorporating local cultural rites.197  A number of commissions deal 
with large patterns of abuses, such as the one formed in South 
Africa.198  This contrasts with those handling only selected violations, 
such as the “disappearances”-focused Argentine commission.199 
Nevertheless, truth commissions share certain fundamental 
characteristics. 
[(1) T]hey focus on the past.  The events may have occurred in the 
recent past, but a truth commission is not an ongoing body akin to a 
human rights commission. 
[(2) They] investigate a pattern of abuse over a set period of time 
rather than a specific event.  In its mandate, the truth commission is 
given the parameters of its investigation both in terms of the time 
period covered as well as the type of human rights violations to be 
explored. 
[(3) They are] temporary bod[ies], usually operating over a period 
of six months to two years and completing [their] work by 
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submitting a report.  These parameters are established at the time of 
the commission’s formation, but often an extension can be obtained 
to wrap things up. 
[(4) They] are officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by 
the state.  [In theory], [this should allow] the commission to have 
greater access to information, greater security, and increased 
assurance that its findings will be taken [seriously].  Official 
sanction from the government is crucial because it represents an 
acknowledgment of past wrongs and a commitment to address the 
issues and move on.  Furthermore, governments may be more likely 
to enact recommended reforms if they have established the 
commission.200 
Moreover, truth commissions typically have common goals.  
Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza describe four of the main 
ones: 
[(1)] creating an authoritative record of what happened; 
[(2)] providing a platform for the victims to tell their stories and 
obtain some form of redress; 
[(3)] recommending legislative, structural, or other changes to 
avoid repetition of past abuses; and 
[(4)] establishing who was responsible and providing a measure of 
accountability for the perpetrators.201 
In commenting on the creation of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Nobel laureate and TRC Chair 
Desmond Tutu noted that “[w]hile the Allies could pack up and go 
home after Nuremberg [the war crime tribunals following WWII], we 
in South Africa had to live with one another.”202  Indeed, truth 
commissions can be a powerful tool in furthering the aims of 
restorative justice.  The process may afford victims a sense of 
catharsis and restored dignity.  It may inspire perpetrators to renounce 
hatred and violence.  Psychologically, if not spiritually, the process 
can help bring the community together and heal divisive wounds.  In 
Tutu’s words: “[I]t was enormously therapeutic and cleansing for 
victims to tell their stories (and) the perpetrators had to confess in 
order to get amnesty . . . . This combination of storytelling and 
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confession put[s] it all out in the open.  With full disclosure, people 
feel they can move on.”203 
On the other hand, truth commissions can have the opposite effect.  
“While telling one’s story and hearing details of loved ones’ fates are 
sometimes beneficial, for other victims, these experiences have quite 
different effects, bringing back old anger and triggering posttraumatic 
stress.”204  The South African TRC revealed that while some victims 
felt empowered by telling their stories, others felt angry and face 
posttraumatic stress.205  In fact, “a survey in South Africa found that 
the process had made race relations worse and made people 
angrier.”206 
And while truth commissions are often a feature of governmental 
transition, such transition need not be toward democracy.  For 
example, the truth commissions in Uganda (1986) and Chad (1992) 
were used primarily to discredit the previous regime.207  Other truth 
commissions, such as Uganda’s 1974 version, were little more than 
thinly veiled efforts to placate the international community.208  Even 
in the case of ostensibly more legitimate bodies, such as Zimbabwe’s 
commission (1985) and Haiti’s commission (1996), the actual 
publication of the commission’s report was hampered,209 or 
completely thwarted,210 because it was too critical of the new 
government.211  Some commissions have not even been allowed to 
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complete their work.  Commissions in Bolivia (1982–84) and Ecuador 
(1996–97) were disbanded before fulfilling their mandates because 
the government in each case found the process had become too 
politically problematic.212 
Overall, truth commissions often come up short in achieving their 
desired results.  As explained by Eric Brahm: 
First, they may have an impossible mission.  The needs of victims 
may be incompatible with the needs of society.  Second, it is argued 
they do not go far enough to deal with the past or generate 
reconciliation.  They do not have the power to punish and have no 
authority to implement reforms.  Third, wiping the slate clean 
benefits those who have committed human rights violations.  This 
damages victims’ self-esteem and denies them justice.  Finally, 
erasing history is difficult.  At minimum, truth commissions pursue 
different types of truth.  They investigate the details of specific 
events while at the same time attempting to explain the factors and 
circumstances behind the gross human rights violations the state 
experienced.  In short, truth commissions often seem asked to do 
too much with too little.213 
C.  Lustration 
Lustration is another quasi-judicial mechanism that entails 
identifying officials and collaborators of the former criminal 
government and barring them from serving in or exerting influence 
over the new regime.214  Lustration has been used widely in former 
Soviet Bloc countries that have transitioned from communism to 
democracy, such as Poland and the Czech Republic.215  Lustration 
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laws tend to cull names from the previous regime’s police files.216  
“This information is then used to determine whether suspected 
individuals collaborated with the former state security service.”217 
Lustration has also been used in postwar Germany to purge former 
Nazis, in post-Saddam Iraq as part of the “de-baathification process” 
(Ba’ath was Saddam’s party), and in postauthoritarian Latin 
American societies, such as El Salvador.218  In Iraq, for example, U.S. 
administrator L. Paul Bremer “established a Supreme National 
Debaathification Commission to root out senior Baathists from Iraqi 
ministries and hear appeals from Baathists who were in the lowest 
ranks of the party’s senior leadership.”219 
Lustration laws generally contain both procedural and substantive 
parts.220  The substantive part determines: (1) the positions in the new 
democratic system that may not be filled by members of the previous 
government and (2) the posts in the previous regime that would 
disqualify individuals from or necessitate inquiry for service in the 
new government.221  The procedural aspect establishes the body 
tasked to administer the lustration law and the process by which such 
law will be carried out.222  Lustration is typically performed by a 
commission or similar administrative body.223 
Certain lustration laws appear more judicial in character.  The 
Polish version, for example, establishes a special lustration prosecutor 
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and designates the Warsaw Court of Appeal as its lustration court.224  
The law lays out a special judicial procedure directly linked with 
Poland’s regular criminal law.225  The prosecutor or a member of 
Parliament can initiate the process.226  Nevertheless, as it “only seeks 
to sanction those individuals in positions to undermine the democratic 
process, lustration as a tool of transitional justice could be thought of 
as a midpoint in terms of severity between retributive justice and 
restorative justice.”227 
Lustration is often justified on the ground that it permits fragile 
democracies to take root by preventing those who would harm them 
from assuming positions of power.228  Consistent with this, lustration 
is also valued by some for its ability to prevent members of new 
regimes from being subjected to political “blackmail,” e.g., being 
asked for political favors under threat of having their past service 
exposed.229  Lustration’s advocates believe it ultimately contributes to 
establishing “historical truth” and national reconciliation while also 
establishing a minimum baseline of justice that is only 
“semiretributive” in nature.230 
That said, lustration is not without its critics.  They fault the 
procedure for: (1) the anomaly of determining a person’s suitability 
for performing various functions in a democratic state based on 
information in internal files of a police state; (2) the fact that, in any 
event, those internal files are often inaccurate or incomplete; (3) the 
procedural defects implicated by the age of the records (raising statute 
of limitations or laches concerns), their hearsay quality, and the ex 
post facto nature of the law giving rise to the accusations;231 (4) the 
narrowness of the inquiry into the person’s past—focusing on 
whether the person was associated with a regime—not on whether 
that specific person was responsible for human rights violations; and 
(5) the limited or nonexistent rights to judicial review.232 
 
224 David, supra note 220, at 411. 
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227 Hollywood, supra note 216, at 96. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 97. 
230 Id. at 96–97. 
231 Id. at 97–99.  Critics also point out that lustration deprives emerging democracies of 
rare and valuable human resources.  Id. at 97.  It also prevents old apparatchiks from being 
inculcated in the democratic values of the new regime. 
232 See Boed, supra note 214, at 377–78. 
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In considering the Czech law, Roman Boed thus concludes that 
lustration “results in legally-impermissible [sic] discrimination which 
breaches the state’s obligation to guarantee to persons within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law[,] . . . infringes on the 
individual’s right to work[,] . . . breaches the state’s obligation to 
promote this right[,] . . . [and] does not secure an individual’s right to 
a fair hearing.”233 
D.  Reparations 
Although they can be a component of other forms of transitional 
justice, such as truth commissions or traditional rituals, reparations to 
victims can be a justice mechanism in their own right.234  The UN’s 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation lists five categories of reparations: (1) restitution or 
restitution in integrum, which seeks to restore the victim to the status 
quo ante or “original situation” before the violation occurred; (2) 
compensation, whereby victims receive money for quantifiable 
harms; (3) rehabilitation, which could include all relevant medical, 
psychological, social, and legal support services; (4) satisfaction, a 
fairly broad category that includes varied measures such as public 
apologies, truth-finding processes, and sanctions for perpetrators; and 
(5) guarantees of nonrepetition, including both institutional and legal 
reform and the promotion of mechanisms to prevent and monitor 
future social conflict.235 
As noted by Lisa Laplante: “Awarding . . . [reparations] to victims 
of human rights violations—such as disappearances, extrajudicial 
killings, unjust detention, torture and rape—is complementary to 
traditional justice measures, especially as a way to restore human 
dignity and redress harm caused by human rights violations.”236  
Reparations also possess retributive and deterrent features, holding 
 
233 Id. at 398. 
234 See Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, 
Reparations, and the Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 159 
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International Humanitarian Law, G.A. RES. 60/147, ¶¶ 19–23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 
(Mar. 21, 2006). 
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the state accountable for its past acts and omissions, and thus helping 
fight against potential future impunity.237 
The administration of reparations, however, can present a 
significant obstacle.  “First, few transitioning states have the funds to 
compensate all the victims deserving of assistance.”238  And 
donations from wealthy foreign donors or even a “reparations tax” are 
unlikely to take care of the problem.239  Second, assuming the 
fledgling government is capable of paying reparations, doing so may 
“unsettle property rights and interfere with economic reform by 
creating new claims against existing property holders.”240  Finally, 
identifying those individuals deserving of reparations, even with truth 
commission victim lists, can often pose insurmountable logistical 
questions for battle-scarred, poor nations transitioning to 
democracy.241  One significant issue, in this regard, is proof problems 
in demonstrating a sufficient nexus between specific criminal activity 
and particular injuries.242 
Even if these hurdles could be overcome, reparations dividends 
may ultimately be minimal.  On one hand, reparations in their 
narrowest form provide benefits to certain victims only for particular, 
defined losses.243  Such case-by-case reparations risk “disaggregating 
the harm suffered by victims and fragmenting various victims 
groups.”244  On the other hand, broader reparations for collective 
harms, if stretched too far, might “begin to resemble a development 
program” only “remotely directed towards the wrongs suffered by 
victims.”245 
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238 Hollywood, supra note 216, at 92. 
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E.  Amnesties 
Amnesty, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, addresses 
“political offenses with respect to which forgiveness is deemed more 
expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment.”246  
Amnesties present a troubling paradox: they are typically unavailable 
for ordinary domestic crime yet arise frequently in situations of mass 
atrocity.247 
In the transitional justice context, there are different kinds of 
amnesties.  Some of them are unqualified.248  Of these, certain 
amnesties are granted by existing governments to rebel groups—as 
was the case in Uganda when the government enacted an Amnesty 
Act for LRA rebels in 2000.249  Other amnesties are granted by new 
regimes vis-à-vis the crimes of their predecessor, e.g., when the new 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua granted amnesty in 1985 to 
armed forces that had been opposing the Sandinistas.250 
In other situations, unqualified amnesty can be self-accorded by 
outgoing regimes that anticipate the incoming regime may want to 
prosecute them for human rights abuses.251  Such was the case in 
Chile, for example, where the departing Pinochet government 
pardoned its leaders on the way out.252 
Qualified amnesty, for its part, is often conditioned on the suspect 
providing something in return for the pledge not to prosecute.  
Typically, this consists of a confession or other details regarding 
crimes committed by the old regime.253  Often, this is done in the 
context of a truth commission.  This was the case in South Africa.254  
In order to be eligible for amnesty before the South African TRC, a 
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perpetrator had to make a full disclosure of any involvement in 
crimes.255  This had to be corroborated with other evidence and 
testimony.256  And the perpetrator had to demonstrate that the crime 
was committed for a political reason.257 
Proponents of amnesties claim several advantages: (1) amnesties 
can serve as a “carrot” to end conflicts where governments offer, or 
opposition forces demand, amnesty as a precondition for entering into 
negotiations for peace;258 (2) “amnesty provisions may be a 
precondition for a dictatorial regime to give up power”;259 and (3) 
when a country’s judicial infrastructure is in shambles, amnesties, in 
conjunction with truth commissions, may prove necessary to establish 
the truth regarding past abuses, which carries considerable healing 
power for individual victims and the transitional society at large.260 
Opponents of amnesties describe them as a miscarriage of justice 
that reinforces impunity and undermines the move toward a 
burgeoning rule of law.261  In reference to the South African TRC, 
one observer has noted, “From a retributive point of view, it is not 
immediately clear why a murderer who kills for political reasons 
should be entitled to amnesty in return for the truth, while one who 
kills out of passion or greed should not.”262  Moreover, as observed 
by Mark Drumbl, notwithstanding any advantages of amnesties, they 
“selectivize punishment of extraordinary international criminals at the 
national level in a manner that hampers retribution as a principled 
penological goal.”263 
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IV 
FORMULATING ANALYTIC CRITERIA FOR COMPLEMENTARITY 
EVALUATION 
Can domestic resort to one or more of the categories of alternative 
justice, either separately or in tandem, satisfy the ICC’s 
complementarity standard?  Given the variety and complexity of these 
mechanisms, as well as the varied scenarios giving rise to the 
initiation of ICC prosecutions and requests for deferral, this question 
defies superficial analysis.  Instead, digging below the surface, certain 
aspects of the domestic justice effort and its relationship to the ICC 
should be considered.  This consideration results in the formulation of 
a set of analytic criteria that eschews a myopic focus on the justice 
mechanism itself and permits a more fulsome consideration of the 
complementarity issue.  These analytic criteria include: (1) the 
circumstances surrounding the ICC referral and request for deferral, 
(2) the state of affairs in the domestic jurisdiction seeking deferral, (3) 
the alternative justice mechanism itself, (4) the crimes at issue, and 
(5) the prosecution target.  Each of these shall be considered in turn. 
A.  Circumstances Surrounding the ICC Referral and the Request for 
Deferral 
One of the key exogenous considerations turns on ICC procedural 
mechanics and international relations: to wit, how was the ICC seized 
of the case in the first place, and what prompted the state to ask for a 
deferral on complementarity grounds?  To examine these factors, the 
ICC framework for referrals and deferrals must be accounted for. 
Cases may be referred to the ICC by one of four methods: (1) 
pursuant to Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute, a member 
country of the Assembly of States Parties (e.g., a country that has 
ratified the Rome Statute) may refer a case;264 (2) per Article 13(b), 
the Security Council may refer the case—subject, of course, to veto 
from the five permanent members;265 (3) under Articles 13(c) and 15, 
the ICC’s three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber may authorize a case 
initiated by the ICC Prosecutor;266 or (4) pursuant to Article 12(2) 
 
264 Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 13(a), 14. 
265 Id. art. 13(b).  To date, the Security Council has made only one such referral—the 
“Situation in Darfur, Sudan” in March 2005.  See William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial 
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
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and (3), the Rome Statute allows for member country referrals or 
prosecutor-initiated prosecutions with respect to nonmember 
countries, provided the nonmember has chosen to accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.267 
Moreover, as noted above, a state may request ICC deferral on 
complementarity grounds either earlier or later on in the case.  
Pursuant to Article 18, within one month of the ICC Prosecutor’s 
notice to a state of case initiation, the state may inform the ICC that it 
is handling the matter and request that the Prosecutor suspend the 
inquiry.268  Article 19 permits a state to request deferral at later stages 
of the case.269 
In terms of deciding whether any such request should be granted, it 
is useful to inquire about the source, motivation, and timing of the 
initial referral and the subsequent request for deferral.  Concerning 
the initial referral, the various scenarios bear differently on the 
complementarity calculus.  Referrals clearly bifurcate into self-
generated and non-self-generated. 
Of the latter, as indicated previously, the case could originate as the 
result of a Security Council resolution, a proprio motu investigation 
by the ICC Prosecutor, or a third-party, member state referral.  The 
first two of these possible scenarios carry important indicia of 
institutional sanction.  A Security Council resolution benefits from the 
imprimatur of the world’s superpowers and indicates a kind of 
international consensus.270  Similarly, prosecutions instituted by the 
ICC Prosecutor reflect internal checks and balances as they are 
reviewed and authorized by a Pre-Trial Chamber.271  Third-party, 
member state referrals reflect the Westphalian preference of the 
international community, as reflected in the earliest drafts of the 
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Rome Statute, that state sovereigns should be the primary moving 
force in triggering international criminal prosecutions.272 
Self-generated referrals, on the other hand, do not appear to inspire 
the same kind of confidence.  They are the result of a novel 
interpretation of Article 14 that, although technically permissible, 
finds no support in the Rome Statute’s travaux préparatoires.273  
Essentially, self-generated referrals represent a government’s request 
for ICC help in dealing with rebel groups.  George Fletcher has 
warned, “The danger of this approach is that [the] ICC will become 
embroiled in civil strife and deploy the powers of the criminal law to 
strengthen one party against the other.”274  William Schabas fears the 
end result would be “establishing a degree of complicity between the 
Office of the Prosecutor and the referring state.”275  Kenneth Roth, 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, elaborates: 
States, overall, have the capacity to do much greater harm than 
rebel groups, because they control the machinery of legitimacy and 
power.  So, when a state is acting inappropriately in this way, I 
think, there is all the more reason to prosecute than if a rebel group 
is doing even the same thing.276 
Accordingly, as a threshold matter, self-generated referrals and 
subsequent requests for deferral must be viewed with a lesser degree 
of deference in conducting complementarity analysis of alternative 
justice mechanisms (or of any assertion of domestic jurisdiction, for 
that matter).277 
The timing of an Article 18 request for deferral, which takes place 
after the ICC has initially admitted the case, should also have 
considerable interpretive value when conducting this analysis.  If the 
request for deferral is made early on, there should be a presumption of 
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good faith bestowing greater deference to the municipal arrogation of 
process.278 
Conversely, an Article 19 application submitted on the eve of trial 
should raise red flags and preclude deference.279  This scenario 
conjures up the image of a rogue state harboring its national 
malefactors and hedging its bets to see if the ICC is true to its word 
and follows through with prosecution.  If the ICC continues, then a 
request for deferral and the hasty establishment of an alternative 
justice mechanism would be pursued.  If not, because the ICC lets the 
case drop due to resource limitations, lack of will, or pressure exerted 
by other international entities, then the stonewalling would be 
justified.  Of course, the greater the period of delay, the more likely 
this scenario has a basis in reality.  As suggested by Louise Arbour 
and Morten Bergsmo: “[U]ndue delay in the state-initiated 
prosecution [raises the question] of a lack of a genuine intention to 
proceed . . . [consistent with] the State [not] acting in good faith.”280 
This is especially the case when such a request comes on the heels of 
several previous ones.  If those earlier requests for deferral had been 
denied because the Pre-Trial Chamber found the domestic mechanism 
wanting, then the current request should be evaluated with very strict 
scrutiny. 
B.  The State of Affairs in the Domestic Jurisdiction Seeking Deferral 
The next area of inquiry narrows the focus from international 
relations to internal political functioning by asking: What is the state 
of affairs in the domestic jurisdiction seeking to use the alternative 
justice mechanism?  This question is crucial since decoupling the 
alternative-justice-complementarity examination from an analysis of 
the mechanism’s surrounding environment is fatally myopic.  This 
contextual information is essential for understanding the formation of 
the mechanism, its legitimacy within the system, its parameters for 
operation, and its likelihood of achieving justice.  It is well accepted 
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280 Louise Arbour & Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional 
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that transitional justice cannot accomplish its objectives in a 
“domestic system that lacks both ‘capacity’ (the physical 
infrastructure and resources) and ‘legitimacy’ (those factors that ‘tend 
to make the decisions of a juridical body acceptable to various 
populations’).”281 
Moreover, implicit in successful transitional justice is the 
significant abatement or cessation of hostilities giving rise to the 
justice initiative.  In fact, given “the challenges of integrating 
transitional justice principles into a pre-post-conflict situation[,] . . . 
‘mechanisms of transitional justice should only be applied [once 
armed groups] have previously agreed with the government to 
demobilize and dismantle.’”282 
Based on these considerations, three criteria related to the domestic 
jurisdiction should be considered: (1) legitimacy; (2) capacity; and (3) 
stability, i.e., the existence of an ongoing conflict that fueled the 
human rights violations at issue. 
1.  Legitimacy 
In the area of transitional justice, legitimacy of the domestic system 
largely depends on the degree to which the system is governed by the 
rule of law.  According to Ruti Teitel, “Post-Cold War transitional 
justice has been largely concerned with advancing a conception of the 
rule of law that is associated with the legitimacy of a country’s local 
juridical and political conditions.”283 
In order for the rule of law to take root in postconflict societies, 
however, there must be some modicum of it to begin with.284  To 
measure whether there is, it is instructive to consider the types of 
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regimes that tend to accede to power during transitional periods—
certain ones are inherently more law based than others.  Although 
transitional justice schemas are protean in nature, two broad 
paradigms can be discerned. 
The first involves new or restored regimes attempting to govern a 
country emerging from cataclysmic violence perpetrated either 
recently or in the more distant past.  Within this model, there are three 
main divisions.  The first involves a brand new government taking 
over the reins of power.  This transition can be effected through the 
ballot box or through battle.  The former is exemplified by Chile’s 
move to an elected government after Augusto Pinochet stepped 
down.285  The latter is illustrated in Rwanda, where the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front became the governing authority upon defeating 
Rwandan government forces, while the 1994 genocide was being 
perpetrated by the same government.286 
The second scenario within this archetype implicates an ousted 
government being restored after the country suffered from massive 
human rights violations postcoup.  This is what happened in Sierra 
Leone when Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s overthrown government 
returned to power after the commission of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes by various rebel factions.287 
The final situation entails the UN forming a provisional authority 
to govern a country recently engulfed in violence committed by a 
previous occupying regime.  This was the case in East Timor where 
UNTAET governed the new country after its Indonesian overlords 
went on a violent rampage before pulling out.288 
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The second paradigm consists of justice efforts undertaken by an 
established regime.  Within this prototype, there are two different 
scenarios.  The first involves a government fighting against rebels 
accused by the former of committing gross human rights violations.  
This is the case in Uganda, where Museveni’s government is fighting 
against the LRA, which committed the human rights violations 
detailed above.289  The other scenario is found in Sudan, where the 
sitting government itself is accused of committing human rights 
violations in Darfur but seeks to bring its own members to justice.290 
Of these two paradigms, the first—new regimes emerging after 
extensive violence—would generally appear to give greater assurance 
of the rule of law.291  Perhaps this is because justice goals are 
embedded in the DNA of such regimes—they typically take over with 
an express or implied mandate to bring the ancien régime’s 
perpetrators to justice.292  And, of course, this often has positive rule-
of-law implications.293 
On the other hand, there are no guarantees in this regard.  First, 
rogue regimes may simply replace other rogue regimes.294  Moreover, 
even if a new regime starts out on the right path, it can often diverge.  
The Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), for example, has been 
increasingly accused of human rights violations in Rwanda over the 
past decade.295  In addition, it is quite possible that justice efforts 
would be initiated long after the regime takes power.  That is the case 
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government, the RPF and its army have again been guilty of significant human rights 
abuses.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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in Cambodia, where justice efforts related to Khmer Rouge atrocities 
are only now being undertaken.296  In the meantime, the current 
Cambodian government has allegedly accumulated a long record of 
flouting the rule of law.297 
By the same token, the second paradigm—when an existing regime 
seeks to employ the justice mechanism—does not necessarily entail a 
government not respecting the rule of law.  Although this might be 
true on the surface in Sudan and Uganda, where the governments 
have been accused of rigging elections and committing atrocities, it is 
not as clear in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), 
where the government was democratically elected pursuant to a 
constitution passed with eighty-four percent of voters’ support and a 
process blessed by the international community as fair and free.298 
Thus, although there is value in considering whether the domestic 
situation falls into the first or second paradigm, the inquiry should not 
end there.  Instead, a series of other criteria should be examined: (1) 
whether the country only recently had gotten out from under the yoke 
of a totalitarian, human rights-violating regime;299 (2) whether the 
current government has been democratically elected or is credibly 
seeking to hold elections in the near future; (3) whether the country 
has a developed degree of civil society; (4) whether the country has a 
stable economic, governmental, and judicial infrastructure (including 
an updated or reformed legal code and effective security forces); (5) 
whether the country has an educational system and free press; and (6) 
whether the country has a record of commitment to and respect for 
 
296 Kathleen Claussen, Recent Development, Up to the Bar? Designing the Hybrid 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 253, 253–54 (2008) (“After 
many years of negotiation and political controversy over the feasibility of such a tribunal, 
the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia created the [Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia] in 2003 to try leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime 
that caused the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people from 1975 to 1979.”). 
297 See Michael Maley, Transplanting Election Regulation, 2 ELECTION L.J. 479, 491 
n.48 (2003) (citing Steve Heder’s written testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, which explained that while Cambodian leader Hun Sen and his 
government pay lip service to principles of democracy and human rights, they “violate 
them at will and with impunity”). 
298 Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms 
Transfers to Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. REV. 383, 404 (2008). 
299 This inquiry is premised on the assumption that, as explained earlier, at the very 
beginning of a new regime following a period of massive violence, there is a greater desire 
to seek accountability and establish the rule of law.  See supra notes 283–84 and 
accompanying text.  So it can be instructive, if not dispositive, to know how recently the 
new regime has risen to power. 
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human rights.300  If these inquiries are answered in the affirmative, 
the country would appear to have a minimum degree of rule of law.  
This should factor in the domestic jurisdiction’s favor in terms of the 
complementarity analysis of the deferral request. 
With regard to the sixth inquiry, perhaps more important 
individually than the others combined, if there is credible evidence 
that the regime seeking deferral has committed human rights 
violations, then it is hard to imagine a scenario where the deferral 
should be granted.  The tougher scenario is when two or more of the 
first five inquiries are answered in the negative.  One could possibly 
imagine, for example, finding that the rule of law has taken root 
solely on the finding of a fairly elected government or a well-
developed civil society—certainly both findings combined would 
help compel such a conclusion.  But if both of these were absent, then 
the recency of ancien régime violence (the first suggested criterion)—
certainly a more collateral factor—would seem highly unlikely, on its 
own, to compel a finding that there is a sufficient degree of rule of 
law. 
Thus, the ICC should take a supple approach in balancing these 
factors and consider the totality of circumstances when deciding 
whether the regime has legitimacy.  Moreover, the Court should 
consider whether the perception of legitimacy is held by both the 
international and local communities.301  Of course, even if there is a 
finding of legitimacy, it will have to be weighed along with the other 
two factors in this category—capacity and stability. 
2.  Capacity 
Even if a country seeking deferral satisfies the legitimacy criterion, 
its physical capacity to dispense justice must also be considered.  In 
 
300 See Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need for a Multi-
Layered, Synergistic Approach, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1443–44 (2008) 
(“Increasingly, international and domestic reformers have come to appreciate that long-
term solutions to security and humanitarian problems depend crucially on building and 
strengthening the rule of law: fostering effective, inclusive, and transparent indigenous 
governance structures; creating fair and independent judicial systems and responsible 
security forces; reforming and updating legal codes; and creating a widely shared public 
commitment to human rights and to using the new or reformed civic structures rather than 
relying on violence or self-help to resolve problems.”). 
301 See Miles M. Jackson, The Customary International Law Duty to Prosecute Crimes 
Against Humanity: A New Framework, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 123 (2007) 
(suggesting the importance of establishing both internal and international legitimacy for 
the new government); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 3, 12 (2005) (discussing the value of local legitimacy). 
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other words, does it possess the necessary resources and 
infrastructure?  “The physical infrastructure often will have sustained 
extensive, crippling damage . . . .”302  Has it been sufficiently 
restored?  Given its connections to the previous regime, judicial 
personnel may “be severely compromised or lacking in essential 
skills.”303  Has there been sufficient vetting and training?  Has the 
country been able to secure funds and assistance from international 
donors?  Negative answers to these questions should lend support to 
an admissibility finding for complementarity purposes. 
3.  Stability 
a.  Circumstances External to the Government 
Are the armed conflict or massive human rights violations that 
prompted the justice efforts ongoing?  Have they abated?  Whereas 
legitimacy and capacity focus on the powers that be, stability focuses 
on the circumstances and environment surrounding the political 
establishment.  If the surrounding circumstances include full-blown 
civil war or popular uprising, then a negative inference should be 
drawn in terms of its effect on complementarity.304 
b.  Internal Government Discord 
Another relevant consideration in this regard is the internal unity of 
the government seeking to use the alternative justice mechanism.305  
Party infighting or interbranch skirmishes should set off alarm bells.  
This is especially true regarding the potential for intragovernmental 
divergence with respect to the transitional justice project itself.  One 
branch of government—the executive, for example—could be 
engaged in legitimate efforts to achieve justice through alternative 
mechanisms.  One could imagine, however, that the military might be 
opposed.306  If the military were in a position, even indirectly, to 
 
302 Dickinson, supra note 288, at 301. 
303 Id. 
304 See Peace v. Justice: Contradictory or Complementary, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 368, 371 (2006) [hereinafter Wierda] (remarks of Marieke Wierda) (indicating that 
transitional justice mechanisms fare better when there is stability in the society seeking to 
use them). 
305 See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 38, at ¶ 45 (“The OTP should be alert to 
the possibility of differing degrees of willingness and internal differences within a State.”). 
306 Id. (“Investigators may be willing but an ‘unwilling’ military may frustrate and 
hinder investigative efforts.”). 
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thwart the success of the justice enterprise, a finding of ICC 
admissibility would likely be warranted.  
C.  The Justice Mechanism 
As the analytical focus narrows, the centerpiece of the examination 
comes into view: scrutiny of the justice mechanism itself.  Regardless 
of the alternative mechanism used, there are three criteria to consider 
for Article 17 complementarity purposes: (1) the circumstances 
surrounding the body’s creation, (2) the degree of its judicialization, 
and (3) its holistic effect on the transition process. 
1.  Circumstances Surrounding the Mechanism’s Creation 
Before focusing on the specific contours of the justice mechanism 
itself, it is imperative to examine the circumstances surrounding its 
creation.  For even if the mechanism is well constructed and internally 
coherent, an illegitimate conception could doom a country’s chances 
for a positive deferral-request outcome.  The classic example, in this 
regard, is the establishment of a truth commission with the evident 
purpose of delegitimizing the previous regime, as opposed to bringing 
out truth and fostering reconciliation.307  Although there may not 
always be smoking-gun evidence of such intent, various statements by 
government officials or persons involved in establishing the 
mechanism, along with a review of the circumstances prevailing in 
the country and the nature of the new regime, could provide sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of bad faith motives. 
Similarly, if a mechanism is set up by the new regime to demonize 
one or more groups in society as part of a divide-and-conquer power 
strategy, the mechanism will have no legitimacy for complementarity 
purposes (or for restorative justice goals, for that matter).  Once again, 
various statements and contextual evidence would have to be amassed 
by the ICC to make this determination. 
2.  Judicialization of the Mechanism 
For complementarity purposes, this second criterion—
judicialization of the mechanism—is likely the most crucial.  In their 
purest restorative forms, alternative justice mechanisms in transitional 
societies are not judicialized at all—they tend to be formed on an ad 
hoc basis and consist of informal processes aiming to bring a 
 
307 See Hayner, Comparative Study, supra note 190, at 612–13, 619, 625. 
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community together and healing its wounds.308  On the other hand, 
“standard” justice mechanisms in postconflict societies, i.e., criminal 
trials, tend to have detailed rules and are less specifically geared 
toward fostering social harmony; these mechanisms are more intent 
on penological coherence and individual criminal responsibility 
through the phases of investigation, trial, and punishment.309  On a 
surface level, this is the ideal complementarity model for domestic 
efforts under Article 17 of the Rome Statute.310  But that does not 
necessarily preclude consideration of alternative mechanisms under 
Article 17.311  Perhaps if the mechanisms possess certain minimum 
indicia of standard judicial process, they too could qualify. 
In this regard, four criteria can be consulted to determine the 
mechanism’s degree of judicialization: (1) the constituent nature of 
the body, (2) the substantive and procedural law of the body, (3) the 
sanctioning power of the body, and (4) the body’s linkage with the 
country’s standard court system. 
a.  Constituent Nature of the Body 
(i)  Type of Body 
As a threshold matter, consideration of the type of mechanism is 
instructive.  Of the alternative justice varieties previously considered, 
some seem inherently more judicialized than others.  For example, as 
noted above, truth commissions often contain many of the hallmarks 
typically associated with a judicialized mechanism.312  They carry out 
investigations, have subpoena powers, conduct hearings, name 
individuals, offer amnesty, and refer cases for punishment.313  
Similarly, customary local mechanisms, especially the modernized 
varieties such as gacaca, employ relatively elaborate procedures 
 
308 See Allison Morris, Critiquing the Critics: A Brief Response to Critics of Restorative 
Justice, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 596, 599 (2002) (“Generally, restorative justice offers a 
more informal and private process over which the parties most directly affected by the 
offence have more control. . . . Thus the procedures followed, those present and the venue 
are often chosen by the parties themselves.”). 
309 See DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 5. 
310 See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 1066 (2008) 
(indicating that criminal trials satisfy the ICC’s complementarity admissibility 
requirement). 
311 See Keller, supra note 18, at 259–60. 
312 See supra text accompanying notes 190–92. 
313 See generally FREEMAN, supra note 192. 
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resembling trials and can offer a right of appeal.314  Some are 
permanently constituted and designed to handle criminal cases.  Some 
can even impose criminal sanctions. 
On the other hand, lustration, reparations, and amnesties, although 
they can be operationalized through administrative bodies that appear 
quasi-judicial in nature, are often the result of bureaucratic procedures 
with minimal process.  In other instances, they are the end product of 
the other two mechanisms—truth commissions and CLPs.  As a 
result, it will be rather rare that lustration, reparations, and amnesties, 
on their own, will be deemed sufficiently judicialized for purposes of 
Article 17 complementarity.  A greater presumption of judicialization 
can be expected with truth commissions and CLPs. 
Although the type of mechanism provides important information, 
drawing definitive conclusions from it would be a mistake.  Each 
mechanism should be considered individually on a case-by-case basis 
according to certain criteria, including: (1) a collateral penological 
function for the body, (2) a permanent versus temporary operation 
(including the existence of institutional methods for developing the 
body), and (3) the nature of the proceeding. 
(ii)  Collateral Penological Function 
Notwithstanding the primarily restorative nature of the mechanism, 
the alternative justice mechanism may be characterized as having a 
collateral penological function rendering it more compatible with 
Article 17.  For example, the traditional version of shalish 
contemplates retributive sanctions to the point of issuing fatwahs.315  
Truth commissions can include the following: investigations that 
resemble classic criminal inquiries, hearings where witnesses are 
subpoenaed and cross-examined, decisions to withhold amnesties, and 
referrals to the court system for punishment.316  Lustrations can be 
wide ranging in their preclusion effect, to the point of looking like a 
retributive tribunal.317  Mechanisms endowed with these penal 
features and objectives begin to look rather judicialized and are more 
attractive candidates for Article 18 or 19 deferral requests. 
 
314 See supra Part III.A (exploring customary local procedures). 
315 See Golub, supra note 86. 
316 See generally FREEMAN, supra note 192 (exploring the procedural aspects of truth 
commissions). 
317 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for 
Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 9, 21–22 (describing 
lustration mechanisms as “punitive in nature”). 
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(iii)  Permanent v. Short-Term 
Institutions that are set up for only specific periods tend to look 
less judicialized.318  This is largely the case for most alternative 
justice mechanisms.  The exception here would be modernized CLPs 
that have been institutionalized by the national government.  
Illustrative of this exception would be the updated versions of shalish 
and Katarungang Pambarangay.319  Given their open-ended 
mandates, these practices take on the appearance of more judicialized 
mechanisms. 
Similarly, if an institution records and keeps records of its 
proceedings, it has the appearance of a more permanent body with 
judicial features.320  This is true of Katarungang Pambarangay, 
which, to a certain extent, creates precedent and allows the 
mechanism to be tracked and studied. 
Related to this, a greater degree of judicialization is indicated by 
procedures and practices established by the institution to self-assess 
its performance and make improvements when necessary.321  Such is 
the case once again with Katarungang Pambarangay, where Lupong 
members meet monthly to evaluate performance and consider reform 
and a Municipal Monitoring Unit tracks data and provides feedback 
regarding the program to the government.322 
(iv)  Nature of the Proceeding 
The nature of the body’s proceedings should also factor into the 
analysis.  For one thing, it is helpful to know if the body will rely on 
“adjudicators” (as opposed to a wide-open meeting style) to preside 
over the proceeding, maintain order, and render a decision based on 
the matters brought up during the session.  This would distinguish the 
 
318 See Randall T. Coyne, Reply to Noah Feldman: Escaping Victor’s Justice by the Use 
of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 17 (2005) (indicating the 
temporary nature of a truth commission and describing it as “nonjudicial”). 
319 See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.5. 
320 See Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal 
Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 444–45 (1996) (describing this 
phenomenon within the context of the development of English legal history). 
321 See Robert D. Lipscher, A Tribute to Chief Justice Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 
683, 687 (1997) (expressing Chief Justice Wilentz’s view that reform is a hallmark of the 
state judiciary). 
322 See Suarez, supra note 152. 
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proceeding as more judicial in nature.323  The modernized CLPs, such 
as gacaca in Rwanda and kgotla in Botswana (where the “headman” 
of the village presides), tend to have this feature.324  The truth 
commissions also have it to the extent they conduct investigations, 
offer amnesties, or refer matters for criminal prosecution.325  If 
special administrative or judicial bodies are set up to make decisions 
regarding lustration, reparations, and amnesty, they may also rely on 
adjudicators. 
Assuming the proceeding does not rely on adjudicators, perhaps it 
resembles a type of formal mediation or arbitration (as in the 
Bangladeshi shalish).  Although less judicial in appearance, these 
proceedings may involve methods of facilitation and control, 
including the use of a conciliation panel (as with Katarungang 
Pambarangay), that are hallmarks of judicial procedure.326 
A further refinement of this feature could be the use of set 
procedures, as opposed to a free-flowing discussion among the 
parties.  If the proceedings follow a set order or consist of 
predetermined statements, presentations, and interactions, then the 
body will more likely resemble a judicial mechanism.  This is 
especially true if members of the public are allowed to witness and 
participate in the proceedings.  This is the case with respect to the 
modernized version of nahe biti boot, which begins with speeches 
from community and religious leaders and is followed by alleged 
perpetrators coming forward to speak about their offenses and 
apologize to the community.327  At the end of the ceremony, victims 
and community members verbally agree to accept the perpetrators’ 
statements.328 
The tenor of the proceedings is also a factor.  If they are loud, 
unruly, and emotional, such as in traditional shalish, then they may be 
 
323 See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of 
Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 857 
(2008) (observing, when discussing the relationship between the judicial branch and the 
electorate, that the judiciary consists of “judges”). 
324 See NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 141, at 94–95; see 
also Waldorf, supra note 16, at 48. 
325 See Bassiouni, supra note 317, at 21 (describing certain tribunals with investigatory 
functions as “hybrid” in nature). 
326 See Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1017, 1034 (2004) (referring to forms of “mediation resembling judicial settlement models 
based in an adversary [model]”). 
327 See Security Man, supra note 127. 
328 Id. 
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considered of a lesser judicial nature.  Proceedings that are marked 
more by solemnity and maintain a sense of decorum and order, such 
as many truth commission formats, take on much more of a judicial 
character.  Similarly, the length of the proceedings should be 
considered.  Although there are no hard and fast rules here, the more 
summary and less considered the body’s proceeding, the less the body 
itself appears judicial in essence. 
b.  Substantive and Procedural Law 
The extent of the mechanism’s reliance on law is another indicium 
of judicialization.  Bodies appear more judicially inclined if they are 
governed by law or by a set of laws.  Such laws could formulate the 
elements of offenses or civil wrongs.  As noted above, the more 
criminal in nature, the more the laws would seem to be compatible 
with Article 17 of the Rome Statute.329 
Such laws could also enshrine the procedural characteristics of the 
mechanism.  In this regard, the level of due process afforded is 
significant.  May the parties be represented at the proceeding—as is 
the case in shalish (where the “accused are represented by two 
members of the parishad and two members from the village”)?330  Is 
there a right to appeal to a higher traditional court (as in gacaca),331 
or, ultimately, to the national courts (as in Botswana’s kgotla 
system)?332  Certain types of lustration have also provided for the 
right to appeal. 
Truth commissions can contain certain due process safeguards as 
well.  For instance, the South African TRC was obligated to provide 
persons “‘proper, reasonable and time[ly] notice’ of hearings if 
evidence detrimentally implicating them [was] to be heard.”333  
Similarly, the statute of the 1986 Uganda Truth Commission 
contained a provision stating that “‘any one who in the opinion of the 
Commissioners is adversely affected by the evidence given before the 
 
329 See supra notes 308–11 and accompanying text. 
330 Zafarullah & Rahman, supra note 92, at 1030 n.45. 
331 Bolocan, supra note 122, at 398. 
332 Connolly, supra note 79, at 282. 
333 Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 375, 386 (1997) (first alteration in original) (quoting the South 
African Supreme Court).  This rule emerged from a decision by the South African 
Supreme Court that was later overruled.  Id. at 386 n.56.  Nevertheless, the South African 
TRC decided to adopt the recommended procedure.  Id. 
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Commission shall be given an opportunity to be heard and to cross-
examine the person giving such evidence.’”334 
A further sign of judicial character is the law’s format.  Written, as 
opposed to strictly oral, law further betokens a judicial quality.335  As 
indicated previously, modernized versions of CLPs, such as gacaca, 
are often established through written laws.336  The same is true of the 
other forms of alternative justice.  Moreover, laws more consistent 
with, or seemingly derivative of, national codes are arguably further 
proof of a mechanism’s judicial essence. 
c.  Sanctioning Power 
While alternative justice mechanisms almost always eschew 
incarceration, they nonetheless avail themselves of other penal or 
quasi-penal sanctions.  As Mark Drumbl points out, CLPs themselves 
are established on the premise of fostering community reconciliation 
through “reintegrative shaming.”337  According to Australian 
criminologist John Braithwaite: “Reintegrative shaming means that 
expressions of community disapproval, which may range from mild 
rebuke to degradation ceremonies, are followed by gestures of 
reacceptance into the community of law-abiding citizens.”338 
Such nonincarcerative sanctions may also include community 
service, civic exclusion (such as barring someone from voting, 
running for office, or both), withholding of amnesty, and restitution or 
reparations.  Clearly, any alternative mechanism shorn of such 
sanctioning power is much less likely to pass muster as an alternative 
to ICC justice under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which arguably 
 
334 Id. at 386 (quoting The Commissions of Inquiry Act (Uganda), Legal Notice No. 5 
(May 16, 1986)). 
335 See Donna Litman, Jewish Law: Deciphering the Code by Global Process and 
Analogy, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 563, 574 (2005) (“The written law contains the 
commandments regarding the judicial system with the appointment of judges for the 
people as well as a provision for resolution of those matters that cannot be resolved by 
these judges.” (emphasis added)). 
336 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
337 See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in 
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1264–67 (2000) (explaining how restorative justice 
mechanisms, such as gacaca, affect reintegrative shaming and are valuable counterpoints 
to criminal trials for lower-level perpetrators in mass atrocity situations). 
338 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989).  Drumbl 
posits that “[s]haming sanctions without reintegration may create exclusionary humiliation 
and an absence of remorse.”  Drumbl, supra note 337, at 1258 n.167.  He concludes that, 
in fragile post-atrocity societies such as Rwanda, “this may simply prolong ethnic hatred.”  
Id. 
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contemplates some form of sanctioning consistent with the general 
penal nature of the ICC and its core purpose of ending impunity.339 
d.  Linkage with the National Justice System 
Although alternative justice mechanisms can often operate 
separately from the national systems of which they are a part, the 
mechanisms are often linked to them.  It is submitted that such 
linkage, which is evidence of a connection with domestic courts, 
should be another indicium of judicialization.  Linkage can occur in 
three separate ways: (1) the alternative mechanism uses national 
enforcement powers, (2) the national system depends on the 
alternative mechanism for exhaustion requirements and serves as an 
ultimate appeal body for the alternative mechanism, or (3) the 
alternative mechanism is adopted by and integrated into the national 
legal system. 
(i)  Use of National Enforcement Powers 
The alternative mechanism may have to rely on the domestic courts 
for realizing various enforcement objectives, such as making good on 
subpoenas (often used by truth commissions) or issuing and executing 
warrants (as in Botswana’s kgotla).340  This represents the lowest 
degree of institutional linkage. 
(ii)  Exhaustion Prerequisite 
Some states mandate use of traditional mechanisms as part of an 
exhaustion of remedies requirement.  For example, in Katarungang 
Pambarangay, “submission of a dispute to the conciliation panel is a 
prerequisite to filing” a case in a Filipino state court.341  This is yet 
another way that alternative mechanisms can be integrated into the 
state judicial system. 
(iii)  Adoption by and Incorporation into the National Legal System 
A state’s adopting the alternative justice mechanism and 
incorporating it into its national legal system evinces the highest 
 
339 See Phakiso Mochochoko, The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the 
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 638, 640 (2002) (“It is also worth 
mentioning that like the two ad hoc Tribunals before it, one of the purposes of the ICC is 
to put an end to impunity by punishing those responsible for the most serious crimes.”). 
340 See Connolly, supra note 79, at 282–83. 
341 Id. at 266. 
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degree of institutional linkage.  Modernized and modified alternative 
mechanisms are often creatures of the state legislation process.  Such 
bodies tend to model a relatively high degree of judicialization given 
their integration into the domestic infrastructure.  The Rwandan state 
version of gacaca is a prime example: (1) it was established by statute 
and relies on written law, (2) it is a standing body that employs 
permanent official administrators and judges that are state employees, 
(3) it is systematically organized and integrated into administrative 
divisions of local government, (4) it imposes prison sentences on 
those found guilty, and (5) it provides a right to appeal.342  Similarly, 
although not to the same degree, remedies prescribed through 
Katarungang Pambarangay are enforceable through state courts in 
the Philippines.343 
Truth commissions are also typically created by states344 and enjoy 
significant institutional linkage with the state’s judicial apparatus.345  
Lustration tribunals, particularly in their power to investigate and 
provide the right of appeal, may also be grafted on to the national 
judicial framework. 
3.  Holistic Effect on the Transition Process 
Regardless of its origins and judicial characteristics, the Article 17 
complementarity analysis should also include an assessment of the 
mechanism’s likely effect on the country’s global transition process.  
In other words, even if the mechanism can meet the other criteria just 
considered, it must be scrutinized for the most important 
consideration: its capacity to bring short- and long-term peace and 
domestic stability to the region for which it is proposed.346  To make 
 
342 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
343 See Connolly, supra note 79, at 266. 
344 See Tom Syring, Truth Versus Justice: A Tale of Two Cities?, 12 INT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 143, 158 (2006) (referring to truth commissions as generally being state organs).  
Of course, as opposed to other state-linked institutions, truth commissions are ad hoc in 
nature.  Id. 
345 See Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya: Report of the Task Force on the 
Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 15, 44–45 (2004) (describing truth commissions as “quasi-judicial” and generally 
detailing institutional connections between truth commissions and states, including judicial 
sanctions and establishment of victim compensation funds). 
346 See Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical 
Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 713 (2006) (“[R]estorative justice focuses on 
‘reestablishing the integrated community, rather than exacting retribution for crimes,’ and 
‘promoting reconciliation and peace between and among the affected parties is more 
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this determination, it would be useful to evaluate the scope of the 
targets contemplated by the mechanism, as well as the potential 
pitfalls and the likelihood of alienating or excluding important groups 
in the postconflict society. 
First, it would behoove the ICC to consider the scope of targets 
contemplated by the mechanism.  Even if the mechanism is 
appropriate for bringing to justice those in leadership positions 
(referred to by Mark Drumbl as “conflict entrepreneurs”347), that may 
not be sufficient for the collective healing purposes of transitional 
justice in cases of all-pervasive violence.  Drumbl writes about 
“complicity cascades” in mass atrocity—the way culpability can 
envelop an entire society to its lowest echelons.348  As a result, in 
such contexts, restorative justice may call for collective sanction: 
The threat of collective sanctions may activate group members to 
marginalize the conduct of conflict entrepreneurs or, in the best-
case scenario, snuff it out. . . .  
. . . Citizens should be put on notice that they cannot stand by while 
hatemongering becomes normalized . . . . 
. . . Any structure that incentivizes the masses to root out the 
conflict entrepreneur before that individual can indoctrinate and 
brainwash will diminish the depth of perpetrator moral 
disengagement that is a condition precedent to mass atrocity.  Such 
a structure thereby inhibits early on, when inhibition still remains 
possible . . . .349 
In such cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, an 
effective holistic approach for the alternative justice mechanism 
would contemplate handling the full spectrum of the culpable, right 
down to the foot soldiers and bystanders.350 
Similarly, to satisfy this holistic criterion, the justice mechanism 
should permit participation from all sectors of society—rich and poor, 
young and old, male and female.  Consistent with this, it should not 
 
important than vengeance.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting RUTH ANN STRICKLAND, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 19–20 (2004))). 
347 DRUMBL, supra note 77, at 202. 
348 See id. 
349 Id. at 202–03. 
350 Although the ICC targets those most responsible for international crimes, this 
Article takes the position that the Court should nevertheless consider the overall 
effectiveness of the proposed alternative mechanism.  This may very well entail assessing 
the mechanism’s capacity to affect the ICC’s overarching goal—“to guarantee lasting 
respect for and the enforcement of international justice.”  Rome Statute, supra note 15, 
pmbl. 
 680 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
resonate with only certain ethnic or religious groups in a society and 
not with others.351  Certain CLPs, for example, originate in specific 
cultures that may not be appreciated or understood by other cultures 
within the same country.  This carries the risk of exerting a negative 
influence on the transition process. 
In this regard, to the extent possible, the mechanism ought to take 
into account the interests and desires of the atrocity victims.  The ICC 
gives atrocity victims “a much more significant role than has any 
previous international criminal institution.”352  According to the 
Rome Statute, the Court must “permit [victims’] views and concerns 
to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court.”353  In fact, the ICC must 
consider victims’ interests in making a plethora of decisions, 
including whether to initiate an investigation into particular 
allegations354 and whether to bring charges.355  The complementarity 
analysis in this area should also take into account victims’ wishes 
with respect to whether a local alternative justice mechanism should 
be employed. 
Finally, the mechanism should be free of other institutional pitfalls.  
For example, it should not be subject to corruption or incompetent 
administration.  And it should be able to fill its positions with capable 
personnel, especially mediators, adjudicators, and administrators.  All 
of these factors should be taken into account in conducting the 
complementarity analysis.  The more they are present, the more 
deference will be given to the alternative mechanism. 
D.  The Crimes at Issue 
In conducting the complementarity analysis, two aspects regarding 
the crimes themselves bear scrutiny: (1) the relationship between the 
crimes charged by the ICC and the crimes contemplated by the 
alternative justice mechanism and (2) the gravity of the crimes. 
 
351 See Penelope Harley, The Globalization of ADR: Feeling the Way Forward? 
(Ruminations of a “Female, Peace-Making Interested, Restorative Justice Oriented 
Flake!”), 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 283, 291 (2006) (“Restorative justice practices 
seek to ensure fair and equal participation of all parties, particularly those more 
traditionally marginalized in society.”). 
352 Gordon, supra note 49, at 696. 
353 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 68(3). 
354 Id. art. 53(1)(c). 
355 Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
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1.  Parallel Crimes? 
As a threshold matter, complementarity entails parallel charging at 
the domestic level.356  The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has held that, in 
the case of a concurrent national proceeding, an ICC inadmissibility 
finding under the complementarity principle requires that the 
domestic action “encompass both the person and the conduct which is 
the subject of the case before the Court.”357  In the case of DR Congo 
rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that 
the DR Congo’s prosecution of the defendant for atrocity crimes did 
not encompass conscripting child soldiers—the basis of the ICC 
charges.358  As a result, the case was found to be admissible.359 
Other cases may not be so simple.  For example, if the domestic 
jurisdiction focuses on the same conduct—such as killing—but 
charges it as murder, then is the case admissible because the ICC 
wishes to charge it as a war crime?  In the context of ne bis in idem, 
Professor Schabas has found that “murder is a very serious crime in 
all justice systems and is generally sanctioned by the most severe 
penalties.”360  On the other hand, 
for a crime under ordinary criminal law such as murder, rather than 
for the truly international offences of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes[,] [i]t will be argued that trial for an 
underlying offence tends to trivialise the crime and contribute to 
revisionism or negationism.  Many who violate human rights may 
be willing to accept the fact that they have committed murder or 
assault, but will refuse to admit the more grievous crimes of 
genocide or crimes against humanity.361 
2.  Gravity 
Under Article 17, gravity is an admissibility requirement in its own 
right—the relative gravity of crimes may be one factor that enters into 
 
356 See Totten & Tyler, supra note 197, at 1097 (“The national proceedings not only 
must be charging the same person as the ICC, but also must be pursuing the same charges 
against that person involving the same criminal conduct.”). 
357 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 38–39 (Feb. 10, 2006) (emphasis added). 
358 Id. 
359 Id. 
360 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 88 (2d ed. 2004). 
361 Id. 
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the ICC Prosecutor’s decision to initiate a case.362  But it should be a 
factor in the alternative justice complementarity calculus as well.  In 
general, as a rule of thumb, the more serious the crimes at issue, the 
more likely the ICC should find the case admissible when a domestic 
jurisdiction seeks to use an alternative justice mechanism. 
a.  Crimes Charged 
Gravity analysis in the complementarity context should be 
multidimensional.  To begin with, it must contemplate the 
consideration of the crime charged by the ICC.  For example, of the 
offenses listed in Articles 6 through 8 of the Rome Statute, genocide 
and crimes against humanity are arguably more heinous than war 
crimes.363  This is reflected in the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which has frequently referred to 
genocide as the “crime of crimes”364 and stated that war crimes “are 
considered as lesser crimes than genocide or crimes against 
humanity.”365 
And the Rome Statute itself implies this.  For example, states may 
accept the ICC treaty as a whole but still opt out of the Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years.366  Moreover, the 
defense of superior orders and defense of property are available with 
respect to war crimes but not genocide and crimes against 
humanity.367  Allison Marston Danner offers a compelling 
explanation for the difference in the gravity calculus: 
[W]ar crimes may often be committed by soldiers acting on their 
own rather than according to a larger policy. 
 
362 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17(1)(d).  Article 17(1)(d) provides that a case is 
inadmissible where it is “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”  
Id. 
363 See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 462–67 (2001) (ranking 
genocide as the most serious offense, followed by crimes against humanity and then war 
crimes, based on their respective chapeaux). 
364 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 981 (Trial 
Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000). 
365 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 14 
(Trial Chamber, Sept. 4, 1998).  The ICTY, on the other hand, has not embraced the 
distinction.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in Sentencing 
Appeals, ¶ 69 (Jan. 26, 2000) (“[T]here is in law no distinction between the seriousness of 
a crime against humanity and that of a war crime.”). 
366 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 124. 
367 Id. art. 33(1)(c), (2). 
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 Therefore, the chapeaux of . . . war crimes . . . require neither an 
illegal collective action nor an act targeted at someone because of 
his affiliation with a group.  Unlike bias crime statutes, the chapeau 
of war crimes has no particular mens rea.  Because its chapeau 
contains no additional indicia of harmful conduct, war crimes 
constitutes the least harmful category of crimes within the 
Tribunals’ jurisdiction.368 
As a result, the ICC should treat complementarity deferral requests in 
cases of war crimes with greater deference than if genocide or crimes 
against humanity were charged. 
By the same token, certain war crimes might be considered less 
grave than others.  For example, if the sole charge against the 
defendant is recruitment of child soldiers (which is nevertheless a 
terrible crime), then the Court should lean more toward a finding of 
inadmissibility versus charges involving the murder of civilians (an 
even more terrible crime).369 
With respect to crimes against humanity, there may also be 
gradations of gravity.  Extermination (Article 7(1)(b)), which entails 
destroying “part of a population,” is surely more severe than unlawful 
imprisonment (Article 7(1)(e)) or deportation (Article 7(1)(d)).370  
Such differences should be factored into the admissibility test. 
b.  Additional Criteria 
The criminal charge itself, though, cannot be the sole measure of 
gravity.  In this regard, although considered in a different context, criteria 
used to interpret the Article 17(1)(d) gravity threshold by the ICC 
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chambers are instructive.  For example, 
statements by the Prosecutor have revealed the following germane 
criteria in conducting a gravity analysis: 
[(1)] the number of persons killed; [(2)] the number of victims, 
particularly in the case of crimes against “physical integrity,” such 
as willful killing or rape; . . . [(3)] the scale of the crimes; [(4)] the 
 
368 Danner, supra note 363, at 472–73 (footnotes omitted). 
369 See Schabas, supra note 265, at 741–42 (suggesting that recruitment of child 
soldiers is a less grave offense than charges involving homicide). 
370 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(b), (1)(e) & (2)(b) (stating that 
“‘[e]xtermination’ includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of 
part of a population”); see also Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, In Search of Coherent 
Jurisprudence for International Criminal Law: Correlating Universal Human 
Responsibilities with Universal Human Rights, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 157, 
203 (2006) (observing that deportation or forced transfer of population are “arguably less 
serious forms of crimes against humanity”). 
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systematicity of the crimes; [(5)] the nature of the crimes; [(6)] the 
manner in which those crimes were committed; and [(7)] the impact 
of the crimes.371 
Moreover, in the Prosecutor v. Lubanga matter, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I (PTC-I) found that “in assessing the gravity of the relevant conduct, 
due consideration must be given to the social alarm such conduct 
may have caused in the international community.”372  Applying this 
criterion, PTC-I found the conduct alleged by the Prosecutor against 
the defendant—including the enlistment, conscription, and use of 
hundreds of children under the age of fifteen in hostilities—caused 
“social alarm” to the international community based on the extent of 
the relevant policy and practice.373 
Although they have not been fleshed out given the paucity of ICC 
jurisprudence, these criteria provide a good basis for evaluating 
gravity in the complementarity context.  Still, a couple of additional 
points of clarification should be added.  With respect to the scale of 
the crimes, it is helpful to inquire whether the entire geographic area 
of a country is involved or only a certain region.  Geographically 
circumscribed offenses should be considered less grave.  By the same 
token, it is instructive to inquire about the percentage of the 
population involved as perpetrators and victims in the country.  A 
smaller percentage, indicating more narrow demographics, tilts the 
complementarity balance in favor of inadmissibility. 
On the other hand, mere numbers are not, of themselves, a 
sufficient gauge.  It is useful as well to examine characteristics of the 
victim population.  If particularly vulnerable segments of the 
population have been targeted, such as children or the handicapped, 
 
371 Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International 
Criminal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807, 824–25 (2008). 
372 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 46 (Feb. 10, 2006) (emphasis added).  PTC-I also 
noted that the relative senior leadership role of the defendant must be taken into account 
with respect to assessing gravity.  Id. ¶ 50.  Consideration of the defendant will be the final 
category of our alternative justice complementarity analysis.  See infra Part IV.E. 
373 Id. ¶ 46. 
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that should factor in prominently.374  So should the impact on the 
victims.375 
Finally, the “social alarm” criterion distilled by PTC-I in the 
Lubanga case could be expanded.376  The Pre-Trial Chamber 
identified “social alarm” in the international community caused by 
the alleged conduct.377  This criterion should also consider the impact 
on the domestic jurisdiction.378  Overall, as with the other categories, 
the gravity analysis should be sufficiently flexible to allow the Court 
to consider the totality of circumstances and make reasoned decisions 
based on the particular facts in each case. 
E.  The Defendants 
The final category in the complementarity admissibility test for 
alternative justice mechanisms should focus on the defendant himself.  
Within this rubric, three factors ought to be considered: (1) the 
fairness of the ICC in target selection, (2) the leadership position of 
the target, and (3) the target’s potential role in the postconflict 
society. 
1.  Target Selection 
To begin, it is worthwhile to step back and consider the ICC’s 
target-selection process.  Does the defendant at issue bear a 
significant measure of responsibility for the crimes charged?  Are 
there other defendants who are equally, if not more, responsible but 
were not charged?  In cases of self-referral, one can imagine, for 
example, the leader of a small rebel group indicted for child 
recruitment activities, even though the government forces they were 
fighting had committed mass atrocities but were not even the subject 
 
374 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 702 (Trial 
Chamber, Aug. 2, 2001) (“[T]he Trial Chamber agrees with the Prosecutor that the number 
of victims and their suffering are relevant factors in determining the sentence and that the 
mistreatment of women or children is especially significant in the present case.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
375 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (Trial 
Chamber, Mar. 15, 2002) (holding that “the extent of the long-term physical, 
psychological and emotional suffering of the immediate victims is relevant to the gravity 
of the offences” (footnotes omitted)). 
376 See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, ¶ 46. 
377 Id. 
378 See SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 371, at 812 (“[T]he impact on the community or 
nation . . . seems a more meaningful standard, particularly in [light] of the Rome Statute’s 
broader goals of ending impunity and promoting deterrence.”). 
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of an investigation.  If the evidence marshaled in support of a deferral 
reveals the defendant bears a disproportionately small share of 
culpability for the commission of crimes in a situation, then this 
should militate in favor of an inadmissibility finding. 
On the other hand, practical considerations should also inform 
target selection.  If the target is still a fugitive, for example, the 
chances of apprehension should be taken into account.  Moreover, 
even if the target is in custody, the complementarity calculus should 
be informed by the ICC Prosecutor’s ability to collect evidence and 
properly develop the case.  If logistical issues such as apprehension 
and evidence collection appear problematic, this should be added to 
the inadmissibility side of the complementarity ledger. 
2.  Leadership Position 
In the context of the gravity threshold, the ICC has noted that it is 
mandated to pursue cases only against “the most senior leaders” in 
any situation under investigation.379  This criterion ought to enter into 
the complementarity analysis as well.  In other words, in line with the 
ICC’s overall mandate, complementarity deferral requests involving 
less senior targets should be given greater deference.  The leadership 
position of the target can be determined with reference to three 
factors: (1) the official rank of the person in an organization or 
government (de jure status), (2) the role actually played by that 
person (de facto status), and (3) the role played in the commission of 
the crimes at issue by the organization or government to which the 
person belonged.380 
With reference to the third of these factors, it is useful to consider 
the type of entity.  If the entity is a relatively small group, such as a 
rebel faction fighting in a discrete territory within the country, this 
should result in heightened deference to the assertion of domestic 
jurisdiction via the alternative justice mechanism.  On the other hand, 
a showing that the defendant belonged to a government committing 
mass atrocities against the wider population throughout the country 
should result in less deference for the referral request. 
 
379 See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, ¶ 50. 
380 See id. ¶¶ 51–52 (providing criteria to determine leadership position within the 
gravity threshold context). 
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3.  Potential for Postjustice Reintegration 
The third factor that enters into the equation here is the defendant’s 
potential for reintegration after facing justice.381  Assuming no life 
sentence is handed down, the highest-ranking leaders convicted of the 
worst atrocities would manage only to wreak havoc on their 
homelands if they were reintroduced into the institutional mix after 
release from prison.382  In the case of conducting complementarity 
analysis for such defendants, assertion of ICC jurisdiction should be 
the result. 
On the other hand, those perpetrators who played lesser roles and 
will have something to offer society postjustice will likely be the 
object of reintegration efforts.383  In that case, the ICC should lean 
toward an inadmissibility finding.  Obviously here, as elsewhere, this 
is only a guide as certain grey-zone cases may require difficult line 
drawing. 
F.  The Analytic Criteria in Broader Perspective 
It is important to situate the analytic criteria within the specific 
conceptual parameters for complementarity established in Article 17 
of the Rome Statute.  As previously discussed, Article 17 generally 
provides for ICC admissibility in cases of volitional or capacity 
deficits in domestic justice efforts.384  And it bears noting that various 
components of each analytic criterion proposed here generally fit into 
one or both of these admissibility rubrics. 
The circumstances surrounding the ICC referral and request for 
deferral call into question the municipal jurisdiction’s genuine desire 
to achieve justice.  The state of affairs in the domestic jurisdiction 
seeking deferral implicates both volition and capacity, as does the 
alternative justice mechanism itself. 
 
381 See Annie Cossins, Restorative Justice and Child Sex Offences, 48 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 359, 360 (2008) (“The aims of restorative justice in reintegrating offenders 
into their communities, repairing the harm suffered by victims and restoring the 
relationship between victim and offender are well documented.”). 
382 See Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1295, 1310–11 (2005) (reviewing FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Philippe Sands ed., 2003)) (suggesting that 
reintegration of offenders can be problematic in mass atrocity situations); Drumbl, supra 
note 337, at 1235 (noting that genocide leaders and “notorious murderers” should be tried 
and punished but lesser offenders should ultimately be reintegrated into society). 
383 See Drumbl, supra note 337, at 1235. 
384 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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Analysis of the crimes at issue and the prosecution target is 
somewhat more complex.  Although these criteria somewhat entail 
issues of capacity and volition, such as the target’s fugitive status385 
or the seriousness of the crimes charged on the domestic level, certain 
other important policy considerations, which are central to the ICC’s 
core mission, also come into play.  For example, the gravity of the 
crimes at issue is of a piece with the ICC’s constitutional imperative 
of taking on only “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole.”386  Similarly, since the ICC is 
interested primarily in prosecuting the “big fish,”387 the leadership 
position of the target is valuable in conducting the complementarity 
analysis.  So is the potential for the target’s reintegration, which is in 
line with the ICC’s goals for restorative justice—especially as 
demonstrated by its concern with the future welfare of victims.388 
At the same time, it should also be pointed out that the proposed 
analytic criteria do not limit the complementarity consideration to a 
superficial examination of the domestic jurisdiction itself.  Instead, 
they oblige the Court to hold a mirror up to itself and review its own 
impact on the process.  Certainly, this is the case with respect to target 
selection, which forces the Court to analyze its own role in potentially 
aiding a government that seeks to deflect blame for its atrocities by 
using The Hague as a leverage mechanism against rebel groups.  
Similarly, in cases of self-referral, consideration of the 
“circumstances surrounding referral” criterion should alert the ICC to 
possible entanglement in internecine squabbles where the Rome 
Statute is used to strengthen one party at the expense of the other. 
Overall, then, the analytic criteria set forth in this Article enrich the 
complementarity test by both including the wider policy implications 
of the Rome Statute and considering the important role played by the 
ICC itself in the delicate balance between respecting state 
 
385 See Edoardo Greppi, Inability to Investigate and Prosecute Under Article 17, in 
NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 274, at 63, 64–65 (noting that one measure of 
inability is when “‘the State is unable to obtain the accused[’]” (quoting Rome Statute, 
supra note 15, art. 17(3))). 
386 Rome Statute, supra note 15, pmbl. 
387 See W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad 
Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 291, 341 (2006) (noting the ICC’s interest in high-level perpetrators). 
388 See Mary Will, Comment, A Balancing Act: The Introduction of Restorative Justice 
in the International Criminal Court’s Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
17 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 85, 113–15 (discussing the ICC’s restorative justice aims in 
the context of victim participation and restitution). 
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sovereignty, ensuring justice for massive human rights violations, and 
promoting the prospects for peace and reconciliation both within the 
municipal jurisdiction and across the globe. 
V 
APPLYING THE ANALYTIC CRITERIA TO THE LRA-UGANDA CASE 
What does all this mean for the ICC-indicted LRA leaders?  If 
Uganda requests Article 19 deferral on the grounds that Joseph Kony 
and his henchmen will be brought to justice at home through the use 
of mato oput and a truth commission, can the ICC find that Uganda is 
either “unwilling or unable genuinely” to prosecute?389  Resolution of 
this issue is an excellent vehicle for applying the newly formulated 
test. 
A.  Circumstances Surrounding the Ugandan Referral and Request 
for Deferral 
With reference to the circumstances surrounding the referral and 
deferral request, the analysis is mixed.  On one hand, as the case 
represents a self-generated referral, its legitimacy as an ICC case is 
inherently suspect—it has the appearance of Uganda merely using the 
Court as a leverage mechanism in a civil war, as opposed to a 
legitimate justice tool.  This perception is heightened by the fact that 
it has been over six years since the case was referred to The Hague in 
the first place.390  Thus, a significant period has lapsed.  On the other 
hand, not much has happened in the ICC case since indictment—the 
case has essentially stagnated.391  It is not as if a deferral request is 
pending on the eve of trial. 
Overall, however, the surrounding circumstances militate in favor 
of denying any potential deferral request.  The ICC should not allow a 
self-referring government to treat the Court as a conflict-strategy on-
off switch.392  It is, instead, a justice mechanism.  Once it is turned 
on, it should not be turned off until justice is done.  Thus, if the 
Ugandan government wishes to kill the proceedings because ICC 
 
389 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17(1). 
390 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation 
Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004). 
391 Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Case Updates, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www 
.ucmk.org.tr/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=54&Itemid=59. 
392 See Discussion, supra note 276, at 765. 
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prosecutions have suddenly become inconvenient for the LRA 
negotiations, then that should weigh against the request for deferral. 
B.  State of Affairs in Uganda 
With respect to legitimacy, Uganda’s “postconflict” situation fits 
the second paradigm described in Part IV.B.1—justice efforts 
undertaken by an established regime that has been in power during 
the abuses at issue.393  And, more specifically, the government is 
fighting against rebels accused of committing gross human rights 
violations.394  Although this model generally appears to give less 
assurance of the rule of law in the domestic jurisdiction, the series of 
legitimacy criteria laid out above should be consulted.395 
The Museveni regime has been in power for nearly a quarter of a 
century and in recent years has been accused of flawed elections and 
human rights abuses both at home and in the neighboring Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.396  According to the BBC: 
DR Congo . . . brought a case to the International Criminal Court in 
The Hague accusing Uganda of committing human rights violations 
and massacring Congolese civilians during its time there. 
. . . . 
 During this period there were increasing complaints that Mr [sic] 
Museveni was growing more hard-line and relying increasingly on a 
kitchen cabinet of hard-line supporters. 
 His 2001 presidential election victory was marred by an increase 
in state-sponsored violence—and Dr [sic] Besigye, again his main 
rival, fled the country claiming his life was in danger.397 
In fact, Museveni’s election victories in 2001 and 2006 have been 
found by the Ugandan Supreme Court to be tainted by vote-
rigging.398  More importantly, there have been atrocity allegations 
lodged against the Ugandan government in connection with its war 
 
393 See supra Part IV.B.1 (examining the paradigms of legitimacy). 
394 See source cited supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
395 See sources cited supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text. 
396 Profile: Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4124584.stm. 
397 Id. 
398 See P. Matsiko wa Mucoori & Ongwens Kisangala, NRM vs UPC: Who Beats the 
Other in Vote Rigging?, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.independent.co.ug/ 
index.php/news/news-analysis/79-news-analysis/564-nrm-vs-upc-who-beats-the-other-in    
-vote-rigging. 
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against the LRA.399  According to Human Rights Watch, “[v]iolations 
committed by the [Ugandan People’s Defense Forces] include 
extrajudicial killings, rape and sexual assault, forcible displacement of 
over one million civilians, and the recruitment of children under the 
age of 15 into government militias.”400 
Although Uganda appears to have a relatively stable governmental 
and economic infrastructure, along with a fairly developed degree of 
both civil society and educational and media institutions,401 its 
seemingly poor human rights record and apparent flouting of 
democratic principles would strip the government of legitimacy in 
terms of complementarity analysis.  This is especially true in light of 
its alleged atrocities in connection with the LRA conflict, which both 
provides a direct nexus with the case at issue and should most directly 
affect admissibility considerations under Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the conflict in Uganda with the LRA 
is technically not at an end.  Although it is relatively localized, 
Uganda is still involved in military operations to stop the LRA.  This 
factor certainly affects any “stability” analysis when evaluating the 
proposed complementarity criteria.402 
C.  The Alternative Justice Mechanisms 
The two primary alternative justice mechanisms contemplated for 
bringing the LRA leaders to justice have been mato oput and a truth 
commission.403  Although the circumstances behind any potential 
creation of such bodies do not suggest the Ugandan government seeks 
to establish them to deflect its own guilt or besmirch a previous 
regime, the circumstances do reveal that Museveni was probably 
using the ICC as little more than a leverage mechanism in its dealings 
 
399 Hum. Rts. Watch, ICC: Investigate All Sides in Uganda (Feb. 4, 2004), 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/02.04.2003-HRW-Uganda.pdf [hereinafter Investigate 
All Sides]. 
400 Id. 
401 See Jeffrey Gettleman, A Film Star in Kampala, Conjuring Amin’s Ghost, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at A1. 
402 See supra Part IV.B.3. 
403 See Keller, supra note 18, at 223 (“The proposed Ugandan Alternative Justice 
Mechanisms (AJM) apparently include a truth commission and traditional justice, 
particularly the Acholi mato oput process.”). 
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with the LRA.404  This fact marginally tilts the complementarity 
balance in favor of admissibility. 
So does the “degree of judicialization” factor—at least with respect 
to mato oput.  There is no indication in discussions regarding mato 
oput that it would carry the most prominent badges of judicialization.  
Although this customary restorative ritual consists of a series of 
formal stages,405 there is currently no hint that it will be modified to 
provide greater formal procedural coherence or uniformity.  Nor has 
the government suggested that it seeks to incorporate the ritual into 
the domestic judicial infrastructure—a move that would endow it with 
greater permanence and institutional linkage.  And, though this 
mechanism entails payment of sanctions, expressions of forgiveness, 
and the possibility of restricted movement, it does not seem to mete 
out other nonincarcerative sanctions, such as community service or 
the stripping of various civic rights.406  Nor is it clear that, in any 
event, mato oput is designed to deal with large-scale crimes such as 
mass abduction or killing. 
Finally, although it could have important restorative effects, mato 
oput could have a net negative holistic effect on the transitional 
justice project.  As mentioned previously, mato oput applies only to 
Acholis.407  And so it will not be able to accommodate non-Acholi 
victims of the LRA’s violence.408  This could alienate large sectors of 
Ugandan society and ultimately have a detrimental effect on the 
reconciliation process.409  By the same token, it is important to 
consider that most Acholis themselves favor restorative justice 
mechanisms over the ICC procedure.410  Eric Blumenson explains, “It 
appears that a substantial majority of the Acholi people, who 
comprise both the victims and the perpetrators of the war with the 
LRA, want reconciliation and favor extending amnesty for all 
rebels.”411 
 
404 See id. at 211. 
405 See supra Part III.A.6. 
406 See Djamba, supra note 177. 
407 See Rose, supra note 181, at 369–70. 
408 See id. 
409 Id. 
410 Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, 
and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 
810 (2006). 
411 Id. 
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A truth commission could be more promising depending on its 
individual characteristics.  Notwithstanding its stand-alone nature and 
lack of permanence, if the commission process entails conducting a 
rigorous investigation, taking statements, using subpoena and search 
and seizure powers, holding public hearings, referring criminal cases 
to the national judicial system, and publishing findings of individual 
responsibility in a final report, then it will certainly go a long way 
toward satisfying the judicialization criterion.  This would be 
especially true if the commission provides significant due process 
protections, such as the rights to proper notice, representation, and 
cross-examination.  And, of course, if it provides for competent 
commissioners and participation by a large cross-section of society, it 
could yield important holistic, reconciliation dividends. 
Moreover, it is not as if Uganda would be proposing the use of one 
alternative mechanism alone.  The possible use of both mato oput and 
a truth commission in tandem could shore up certain deficiencies in 
one mechanism that may not be present in the other and vice versa. 
D.  Crimes at Issue 
As mentioned previously, the LRA leaders have been charged with 
having committed horrific atrocities, including war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.412  As a threshold matter, the alternative justice 
mechanisms proposed by Uganda would have to bring the suspects to 
justice with respect to parallel crimes.  As noted above, it is not clear 
whether mato oput, which has never been used with mass atrocity, 
could be modified for such purposes.413 
And although the LRA leaders have not been accused of genocide, 
the most grave of atrocities, the horrendous nature of their crimes is 
apparent in light of the large number of victims of “physical integrity” 
crimes, such as willful killing or rape; the scale; and the 
systematicness, depravity (including macabre amputations), and 
impact of the crimes, especially with respect to children.414  As 
reported by the Guardian: 
At its peak, the rebels’ brutal insurgency displaced nearly two 
million people in large areas of northern Uganda.  To date, the 
conflict has seen more than 10,000 people killed in massacres, 
 
412 See supra Part V.B (examining the state of affairs in Uganda). 
413 See supra Part V.C (analyzing alternative justice mechanisms). 
414 See Xan Rice, Background: The Lord’s Resistance Army, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 
20, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2007/oct/20/about.uganda. 
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while twice that number of children have been abducted by the 
LRA and forced to work as soldiers, porters and sex slaves. 
. . . . 
. . . Civilians suspected of supporting the government or forming 
self-defence forces had their ears, lips and noses hacked off. 415 
In light of such gravity considerations, prosecution through the 
International Criminal Court appears preferable. 
On the other hand, the crimes charged were committed by a fringe 
rebel group in a geographically circumscribed portion of the country.  
Most of the LRA’s victims have been Acholi416 and that group 
comprises only four percent of the population.417  Acholiland, the 
area of Uganda in which the LRA has primarily operated, comprises a 
mere 11,000 square miles in a country that measures 93,104 square 
miles.418  Still, while these facts help support an inadmissibility 
finding, the recent expansion of LRA operations into the DR Congo, 
Sudan, and the Central African Republic419 reveal a more widespread 
scope of crimes that should be considered in any efforts to bring the 
LRA leaders to justice.420 
E.  The Defendants 
Target selection is one of the most compelling reasons for ICC 
deferral in the LRA case.  Although the LRA leaders bear a 
significant portion of the responsibility for the atrocities at issue as 
 
415 Id. 
416 See Wierda, supra note 304, at 371 (“[T]he Acholi tribe . . . constitutes both the 
majority of perpetrators and the majority of victims in the conflict with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army . . . .”). 
417 See WorldLanguage.com, Uganda, http://www.worldlanguage.com/Countries/ 
Uganda.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
418 WILLIAM HAROLD INGRAMS, UGANDA: A CRISIS OF NATIONHOOD 262 (1960); 
Nat’l Geographic, Uganda Facts, http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/countries/ 
uganda-facts/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
419 See Human Rights Watch Calls for End to Civilian Massacres in Congo, 
VOANEWS.COM, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-16-voa39.cfm 
(“The Human Rights Watch report describes brutal attacks by the Ugandan Lords 
Resistance Army rebel group on villages in Northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 
as well as across the border in southern Sudan.”); Officials: LRA Threat ‘Gravely 
Reduced,’ VOANEWS.COM, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13   
-2009-02-15-voa10-68672292.html (“In recent years, the group has evolved into a regional 
threat, carrying out killings and kidnappings in Congo, southern Sudan and the Central 
African Republic.”). 
420 See Keller, supra note 18, at 229 (“Direct victims include not only the Acholi and 
other Northern Ugandan tribes but also those in neighboring countries who have been 
victims of LRA attacks.”). 
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indicated above,421 Ugandan government forces have also 
participated in massive human rights violations.422  And yet their 
leaders are not the subject of ICC indictments.  This skewed charging 
process translates into a prodeferral factor. 
On the other hand, Kony’s recent forays into other countries 
demonstrate how elusive a fugitive he is.423  Given the increasingly 
transnational dimension of his crimes and flight, perhaps it makes 
more sense to let the more internationally oriented ICC retain 
jurisdiction. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Kony and the other 
indicted defendants sit at the apex of the LRA leadership.  These are 
the types of targets the ICC is designed to investigate and prosecute.  
But this factor, in turn, is partially mitigated by the relatively small 
size of the LRA.424  “According to the Ugandan government, there 
are only 500–1,000 soldiers in total, many of the original LRA 
combatants having been killed in conflict or died of ill health, 
including HIV/AIDS.”425 
Finally, it is hard to conceive the reintegration into postconflict 
Ugandan society of Joseph Kony—a mass murderer and self-
proclaimed mystic with a “garbled pseudo-Christian ideology,” who 
claims he is a medium for holy spirits and has his followers smear 
themselves with nut-oil to make them invulnerable to bullets.426  And 
given the atrocities that can likely be pinned on his indicted top 
henchmen (those who are still alive), their eventual reintroduction 
into society seems equally dubious.427  To the extent the LRA’s less 
 
421 See supra text accompanying notes 412–14. 
422 See supra Part V.B. 
423 Alisha Ryu, Analyst: Uganda’s LRA Leaders Must Be Captured to Stop Killings, 
VOANEWS.COM, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-26-voa40 
.cfm. 
424 See Integrated Reg’l Info. Networks, U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, In-Depth: Living with the LRA: The Juba Peace Initiative, 
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=58&ReportId=72446 (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2010). 
425 Id.  “However, these figures are disputed.  Military sources and international 
observers in Southern Sudan estimate that there could be as many as 3,000 LRA fighters, 
with about 1,500 women and children in tow.”  Id. 
426 Meera Selva, The Mystic and His Brutal Army of Child Soldiers, INDEPENDENT 
(London), July 30, 2004, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-mystic-and 
-his-brutal-army-of-child-soldiers-554907.html. 
427 See generally Amnesty Int’l, Arrest Now! Uganda: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot 
Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (Nov. 2007), http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/ 
Index/ENGAFR590082007 (setting forth the allegations against the indictees).  For 
 696 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 621 
culpable middle management might ultimately be indicted, the 
prospects for reintegration substantially improve.  And they get even 
better for the LRA’s other victims—its unwilling foot soldiers. 
F.  The End Analysis 
Consideration of each criterion in relation to the others yields some 
important conclusions.  There are certainly cogent reasons for 
acceding to a Ugandan deferral request.  To begin, the case has the 
veneer of an unholy alliance between the ICC and Uganda as the 
latter attempts to suppress a local uprising—not the seeming province 
of the world’s sole permanent penal justice institution.  More 
importantly, focusing on Uganda itself, one sees a relatively stable 
country—apart from the localized LRA rebellion in the north—with a 
functioning judiciary and developed infrastructure and civil society. 
And, to a certain degree, the proposed alternative justice 
mechanisms also lend support to the deferral request.  Neither would 
be used to discredit a previous regime and both are seemingly meant 
to foster reconciliation.  They are preferred by the public over ICC 
prosecution, and both mechanisms nevertheless bear significant 
degrees of potential judicialization.  For its part, a truth commission 
has the promise of a thorough investigation, subpoena and search and 
seizure powers, public hearings, criminal case referral, and published 
findings of individual responsibility.  And mato oput could include 
various nonincarcerative sanctions, such as fines and restricted 
movement. 
Combined, mato oput and a truth commission could serve up a 
potent cocktail of restorative justice.  This is especially true in light of 
the fact that the defendants belong to a fringe rebel group that 
 
example, Okot Odiambo, one of the indicted men, is “blamed for leading the LRA’s 
massacre at Barlonya camp in February 2004, when more than 300 people were burnt, shot 
and hacked to death.”  Trial Watch: Okot Odiambo, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/ 
profile/db/facts/okot_odiambo_398.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).  Dominic Ongwen, 
an indicted LRA brigade commander, “is accused of participating in a violent campaign 
targeted against the civilian population . . . [in which] about 2,200 people were allegedly 
murdered and 3,000 abducted . . . [while] enforced recruitment of child soldiers and sexual 
violence against girls” took place.  Trial Watch: Dominic Ongwen, http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/dominic_ongwen_574.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2010).  The Human Rights Watch reports that Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo 
remain at large.  Hum. Rts. Watch, Trail of Death: Introduction, Mar. 28, 2010,  
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/89320/section/6.  Two indictees, Vincent Otti and Raska 
Lukwiya, are reported to have been killed.  See TAUMOHA GHOSH, BERKELEY MODEL 
U.N., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) 4 (2009), http://www.bmun.net/ 
documents/bmun57/topic%20synopses/ICC%20BMUN57.pdf. 
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operates in a hemmed-in portion of the country, ostensibly a matter of 
less international concern for the ICC.  The ICC’s apparently skewed 
target selection only adds to the deferral appeal. 
But these factors are ultimately outweighed by countervailing 
considerations.  First, the circumstances surrounding the referral and 
request for deferral strongly suggest Uganda has been using the Court 
to gain an advantage in its fight against the LRA—not as part of a 
genuine effort to chronicle and punish decades of nightmarish 
atrocities.  And this point is underscored by Uganda’s own “dirty 
hands” in committing atrocities and compromising democratic 
institutions within its own polity.428 
The ultimate restrictions of mato oput and a truth commission in 
terms of limited potential sanctions and linkage with Ugandan courts 
are exacerbated by mato oput’s confined cultural and temporal reach 
(given that the conflict is ongoing) and its questionable atrocity-crime 
adaptability.  And the atrocities at issue are widespread, long term, 
and particularly brutal.  The accused appear patently liable for them 
and, as of this writing, have continued their killing spree in other parts 
of the region.  All this, combined with their violent religious 
fanaticism, augurs ill for their reintegration prospects.  In short, 
notwithstanding the important factors considered above, this case 
does not appear to be a credible candidate for ICC deferral to 
alternative justice mechanisms on complementarity grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the relationship between complementarity and 
alternative justice mechanisms provides the most effective vehicle for 
understanding the interplay between international retributive and local 
restorative approaches to postconflict policy.  In certain respects, both 
forms of justice share important goals. 
As this Article has demonstrated, local restorative justice often 
incorporates certain penal characteristics, including investigations, 
subpoena and search and seizure powers, public hearings with fixed 
procedural rules and due process rights, criminal referral, and limited 
forms of incarceration, such as restrictions on movement.  It also 
features a plethora of nonincarcerative sanctions, including restitution 
or reparations, community service, reintegrative shaming, and the 
stripping of various civic privileges, such as the right to vote and to 
 
428 See Investigate All Sides, supra note 399. 
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run for public office.429  By the same token, international retributive 
justice contemplates certain global restorative outcomes with its 
emphasis on reestablishing peace and security.  Moreover, it has 
evolved to emphasize even local restorative concerns with the ICC’s 
emphasis on victim participation, reparation, and healing. 
For purposes of complementarity, these areas of overlap are 
instructive—especially concerning the judicialization of alternative 
justice mechanisms.  This Article has illustrated that, in certain 
situations, domestic resort to these mechanisms could justify the 
ICC’s ceding of jurisdiction on complementarity grounds.  In these 
cases, knee-jerk determinations regarding municipal desire and ability 
to investigate and prosecute, within the meaning of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, are not in order.  Instead, reference to five germane 
categories—circumstances of the referral or deferral request, the state 
of affairs in the domestic jurisdiction, the nature of the alternative 
mechanism, the crimes that are the object of the alternative 
mechanism, and the accused themselves—should be consulted.430  
Exploration of these categories reveals deeper veins of analytic 
criteria relevant to determining the domestic jurisdiction’s capacity 
and volition to investigate and prosecute.  At the same time, these 
criteria implicate larger Rome Statute policy concerns—such as 
gravity of the conduct and the impact on the local jurisdiction.  This 
analysis provides for a more rigorous and meaningful test. 
The question remains how often municipal appeals for use of 
alternative mechanisms, as filtered through the proposed 
complementarity test, will actually result in deferrals.  The case of 
Uganda, the LRA, and the mato oput/truth commission project is, in 
this regard, enlightening.  Although this Article concludes that the use 
of these alternative mechanisms with respect to the LRA leaders will 
not pass complementarity muster,431 one can easily conceive of 
slightly modified situations with a different result. 
For example, this might be so in cases other than self-referral, if 
the requests for deferral were more timely and the crimes at issue less 
serious, such as child soldier recruitment.  It would also help if the 
country requesting deferral did not have a recent history of human 
rights abuses or disrespecting democratic institutions.  The case 
 
429 See supra Part III.A (analyzing customary local procedures). 
430 See supra Part IV (formulating a set of analytic criteria to evaluate 
complementarity). 
431 See supra Part V.F. 
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would be even stronger if the defendants were not at the very top of 
the command chain and their criminal activity had ceased for a 
sizable period before issuance of the indictment. 
Of course, much depends on the nature of the alternative 
mechanism itself.  Those mechanisms adapted to handle the special 
needs of mass atrocity, such as Rwanda’s gacaca, should fare much 
better in the complementarity calculus than untouched traditional 
models better suited for social counseling and civil mediation.  
Restorative justice pursues noble goals but it cannot help a society 
heal itself in the complete absence of some written standards, 
procedural regularity, and meaningful individual punishment. 
In this regard, countries should be warned against a one-size-fits-
all approach432 or exclusive reliance on one mechanism to the 
exclusion of others.  Uganda seems to have the right idea in proposing 
two mechanisms, a CLP and a truth commission, rather than just 
one.433  But one can easily imagine the use of several at once.  A CLP 
and a truth commission complemented by lustration and reparations, 
for example, present a more compelling case for deferral than just one 
or two mechanisms standing alone would. 
Even amnesties, if used sparingly in response to relatively less 
egregious crimes and for clearly salutary purposes, such as achieving 
national reconciliation and preventing violence, compelling 
testimony, or incriminating higher-level players, could factor 
positively into the mix.  As Sharon Williams and William Schabas 
note in the case of amnesties by South Africa’s TRC: 
For example, all States seem prepared to respect the amnesty for the 
crime against humanity of apartheid that has provided the 
underpinning for the democratic transition in South Africa.  
Although theoretically many States are in a position to prosecute 
former South African officials, on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, there is simply no political willingness to upset the 
political compromises made by Nelson Mandela and others.434 
In fact, one can easily envision a well-designed package of 
multiple, contemporaneous alternative justice mechanisms working 
 
432 See JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 420 
(2008) (noting that a one-size-fits-all approach should be avoided in this area of the law). 
433 See Keller, supra note 18, at 212, 223. 
434 Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17 Issues of Admissibility, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 605, 
619 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
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smoothly and efficiently alongside one another.  Each could 
conceivably complement the other in terms of individual and 
combined effects on truth-telling, victim satisfaction, and social 
reconstruction.  Conversely, although perhaps not impossible, it is 
hard to imagine that the use of any one of the alternative justice 
mechanisms, on its own, would be enough to sway the 
complementarity decision in favor of deferral.435 
Perhaps then the ideal role for alternative justice mechanisms in 
this context could be as a supplement to domestic criminal 
proceedings.  In other words, retributive and restorative justice 
models should not compete with one another in a zero-sum game.  
Working toward a fair determination of individual criminal 
responsibility can go hand in hand with the restorative goals of 
providing catharsis for victims, a record for posterity, reintegration 
for the offenders, and global healing for the community. 
Uganda may have the right idea in this regard as well.  Pursuant to 
an agreement with the LRA, the country is in the process of setting up 
a special domestic war crimes court seemingly for the purpose of 
prosecuting high-level LRA perpetrators, such as Kony.436  If this 
tribunal is used properly and in conjunction with the proposed 
alternative mechanisms to handle LRA “small fish” (including the 
legions of child soldiers),437 such a package could ultimately 
persuade the ICC to defer prosecution of Kony and his immediate 
surviving subordinates in favor of Uganda. 
 
435 Although one can imagine that one or more mechanisms could persuade the ICC not 
to prosecute under Article 53 “in the interests of justice.”  See Rome Statute, supra note 
15, art. 53(2)(c) (“A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or 
infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.”); see also 
STIGEN, supra note 432, at 431–41. 
436 See Anthony Dworkin, The Uganda-LRA War Crimes Agreement, GLOBAL POL’Y 
F., Feb. 25, 2008, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/investigations/uganda/2008/ 
0225dworkin.htm (“Under the agreement [between the Ugandan government and the 
LRA], the government will set up a special division of the High Court of Uganda to try 
‘individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict.’”). 
437 And that seems to be the plan.  According to Dworkin: 
At the same time, alongside the special war crimes division of the High Court, 
the agreement also gives a prominent place to traditional justice. . . . [T]he 
traditional justice system [will] deal with ‘small crimes’ but the precise division 
between crimes that will be handled by the war crimes court and by traditional 
justice is not explicitly spelled out in the accord. 
Id. 
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The point is that alternative justice mechanisms and 
complementarity are not necessarily at loggerheads with one another.  
And calibrating one to satisfy the other does not have to result in 
either, or both, losing its essential traits.  That said, whatever is 
uniquely local and traditional in alternative justice mechanisms 
should never be bred out of existence through domestic co-option.  
Whatever is truly authentic and unifying in these mechanisms must be 
preserved if they are to be properly retrofitted for handling atrocity. 
At the same time, having a victim sit down to drink a bitter animal 
gore conconction with the butcher of thousands of innocent children 
cannot be made to replace prosecution and punishment before a 
global citizenry.  So perhaps effective atrocity justice is more about 
striking the proper degree of a consensual labor division between 
local restoration and global retribution.438  Complementarity may be 
the ideal medium through which to achieve that balance. 
And when it is not, other Rome Statute mechanisms may certainly 
effect local transfer.  As noted previously, Article 53(1)(c) authorizes 
the ICC Prosecutor to kill a case upon a finding of  “substantial 
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests 
of justice.”439  As observed by Jo Stigen: 
Because article 53 presupposes that prosecuting in a given situation 
might, nevertheless, not be in the “interests of justice,” it seems 
imperative to explore whether there are alternative reactions which 
might lessen the need for criminal justice.  To the extent that 
alternative mechanisms address the concerns that criminal justice is 
meant to address, there is less reason to interfere.  A forteriori this 
will be true if an alternative mechanism addresses the concerns even 
better than criminal justice.440 
Article 16, which authorizes the UN Security Council to effectuate 
a twelve-month suspension of ICC cases upon issuance of a Chapter 
VII resolution,441 could be another important means of activating 
local alternative justice mechanisms during post-atrocity peace 
negotiations or in otherwise delicate transitions.  Gareth Evans, 
former President of the International Crisis Group, has noted: 
 
438 See STIGEN, supra note 432, at 464 (“A labour sharing in which the major criminals 
are prosecuted at the ICC and the minor criminals are brought before a national TRC is not 
inconceivable.”). 
439 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 53(1)(c). 
440 STIGEN, supra note 432, at 434. 
441 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 16. 
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“I have no doubt that dealing with impunity and pursing peace can 
work in tandem even in an ongoing conflict situation: these are not 
necessarily incompatible objectives.  The prosecutor’s job is to 
prosecute and he should get on with it with bulldog intensity.  If a 
policy decision needs to be made, in a particular case, to give 
primacy to peace, it should be made not by those with the justice 
mandate, but with the political and conflict resolution mandate, and 
that is the Security Council.  The Statute allows for this in Article 
16, and this is the way the international community should be 
thinking about it.”442 
At the same time, however, justice and peace are often 
indispensable components of transitional success.  In fact, many 
believe that one is not possible without the other.443  And in the case 
of alternative justice mechanisms, complementarity seems to be a 
place where they will often intersect.  If the ICC uses the criteria 
formulated in this Article to take a broader view of complementarity 
in relation to postconflict restorative options, it will go a long way 
toward weaving peace and justice more seamlessly into the 
procedural fabric of international criminal law. 
 
442 OTP’s Second Public Hearing: Looking Ahead, NEWSLETTER (Int’l Criminal Court, 
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443 Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted that “there can be no healing 
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respect for human rights and rule of law.”  Press Release, Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-
General, Secretary-General Welcomes Rwanda Tribunal’s Genocide Judgment as 
Landmark in International Criminal Law, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6687L/2896 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
